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THE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE OF EVIL 
I N THE EARLY THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH 
by 
DAVID JAMES PEAT 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the early theology of Karl Barth. That 
means all the material published between 1911 and 1931. Any work outside this 
period is referred to only in order to clarify a point under discussion. 
This is not an historical study, although reference is made to Barth's 
changing circumstances when appropriate. Primarily this thesis aims to be a 
discussion in systematic theology. It addresses the problem of theological 
objectivity, that is, how can the theologian when speaking of God say "this is 
the case". The thesis concentrates upon Barth's understanding of ontology as it 
fuelled his thinking during the early years. It highlights the way in which 
Barth's growing awareness of God's freedom, sovereignty and subjectivity 
formed the foundation of a theological approach. 
The thesis is selective in the material on which draws. Strong emphasis 
is placed upon the influences of Holy Scripture, the writings of Christoph 
Blumhardt and Franz Overbeck, along with the debates in which Barth engaged 
with the thinking of Schleiermacher and Harnack. Finally attention is drawn to 
the way in which Barth's study of the works of Anselm helped him overcome 
the weaknesses of his early thinking and move towards his Dogmatic approach. 
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PREFACE 
Some years ago I found myself, through a complicated series of events, 
working in one of this country's largest cities. Through my experiences of 
people and circumstances I became aware in the most frightening way of the 
existence and presence of evil. I say frightening because while the exact details 
of events have faded with the years the memory of dread and fear has not. I still 
remember with disturbing clarity the ferocious and malicious force involved in 
those events, a force driven by a mind both malignant and cunning. The events 
themselves have no baring upon this thesis. However, my own sense of 
theological inadequacy at the time most certainly does. 
As a theology graduate I began to think as deeply as I could about the 
nature of my experiences. I tried to make sense of them in relation to my own 
understanding of the Christian Gospel. I found this frustrating and difficult. 
At the time I had two primary theological sources on which to draw. 
One was the foundation laid as an undergraduate in a self-confessed 'liberal' 
theology department. The other was the whole theology of charismatic renewal 
with which I was involved at that time. Both were of only limited help in my 
search for a clearer theological perspective. 
Some years later, while training to be ordained in the Church of 
England, I vowed to discover a more helpful understanding of the nature of 
objective evil. In this I was greatly helped by Professor Daniel W. Hardy, then 
teaching at Durham University. It was he who first introduced me to the 
thinking of Karl Barth. 
Initially I read sections from the "Church Dogmatics" and was 
immediately gripped by the power and intensity of his writing. But before long I 
realised that Barth had based his approach on a set of theological premises 
which had been laid down many years before. I also came to understand that 
specific questions surrounding the objective existence of evil could not be 
separated from broader issues concerning the whole basis and possibility of 
Christian theology. 
So it was that I found myself, with the help of Professor Hardy, drawn 
into a debate which began some fi f ty one years before I was born and has as yet 
reached no satisfactory conclusion. Studying Barth has been difficult, disturbing 
and hugely rewarding. I hope that this thesis, while it brings no profound new 
insight to the arena of debate, might at least encourage those who read it to 
study for themselves a man who has for me been an inspiration and whose 
vision I wil l most certainly carry with me for the rest of my life. 
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THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION 
The aim of this thesis is to explore some of the theological problems 
surrounding the objective existence of evil. To this end all of the issues 
discussed wil l be drawn from, and illustrated by, the early theology of Karl 
Barth. 
Barth has been chosen for a number of reasons. It is clear from the most 
cursory examination of his theology that he treats the existence of evil, and the 
occurrence of human sin, with the utmost seriousness.1 These two themes are 
never far from the forefront of his thinking. However, he presents them as part 
of a broader 'scheme', which is itself built upon both subtle and yet substantial 
theological foundations. This fact should not be obscured by the powerful 
polemic which provided the form for so much of his early theology. 
From first to last Barth is struggling with weighty theological problems. 
It is now a matter of historical fact that European theology experienced a period 
of upheaval at the turn of the twentieth century. It is also true that Barth stood at 
the centre of that disturbance. 
While the outbreak of the First World War provided the necessary force 
to start the intellectual avalanche that followed, the roots of the disturbance lay 
in the theological and social developments of the nineteenth century.2 Barth's 
great attack upon the theology of that period was never purely partisan, 
although figures such as Schleiermacher and Harnack suffered particular 
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The Basis of Discussion 
criticism. Barth's great concern always remained the nature of theology itself, 
the 'problem' of theology, the 'possibility' of theology, the 'necessity' of 
theology.3 
As someone who brooded "alternatively over the newspaper and New 
Testament"4 Barth can only be understood correctly within the larger context of 
world history. He saw himself not as the founder of a particular 'school', but as 
both a player and observer in the great quest of humanity; that is, the search for 
'truth'. Eberhard Jiingel said of Barth, 
When a serious illness forced him to face his own death, 
he gave it the same sideways glance that he had given 
theologically to the powers of darkness. The light which 
shines in the darkness interested him more than the 
darkness. He thought it more important to dwell on the 
riches of the eternal God than on the sombre dominion of 
death.5 
It is indeed true, as will be shown, that Barth allowed evil only a 
"sideways glance". The greater drama draws his attention. The would-be 
student of Barth cannot help but be drawn into the self-same drama, or else run 
the risk of losing the only realistic perspective upon Barth's theology. It was to 
the greater "vision" 6 that he felt called in the early years of the twentieth 
century and to which his students must also give their minds. The partisan, 
standing as he might upon any single point of the theological spectrum, will 
surely fail to grasp the breadth and scope of Barth's theology. It can be said of 
Barth, as he himself said of Schleiermacher, that 
we can grant... what even the most negative judgement 
upon the theological content of his work must grant... the 
6 
The Basis of Discussion 
trouble he took to safeguard the specifically theological 
quality of his theology.7 
What this means in practice is that the scope of this thesis must be 
broader than its title might suggest. While it wil l indeed concern itself with the 
nature of evil, and in particular that which has a direction and existence all its 
own, it will do so only from a particular perspective. 
The interest behind what follows is not primarily historical. Obviously 
Barth's theology was influenced by the events of his day, but these events in 
themselves cannot explain what Barth thought and a simple retelling of the story 
wil l not suffice. Therefore, what follows is an exploration of Barth's approach 
to a fundamental theological problem; the nature of 'objective truth'. How can 
the theologian say with any degree of certainty "this is the case"? 
The world is ful l of various sorts of 'objects'. The ways in which they 
are understood and investigated are numerous and diverse. The question which 
the theologian must answer is what kind of 'object' is it appropriate for him to 
study and where might that 'object' be found? This is Barth's basic problem. It 
is a question which concerns the nature of God. What will be shown is that in 
Barth's thinking this problem is inseparably linked with the relationship which 
he sees as existing between ontology, rationality and revelation. It is only in this 
context that his thinking on objective evil can be understood. 
However, before the discussion proper can begin, a number of things 
need to be said. The most obvious of these is that, before the student of Barth 
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can begin his work, he must find a 'way in 1 to the material. For although Barth 
was someone opposed to any attempt at systematizing theology,8 his writings 
provide an almost seamless piece of finely woven theological cloth. His method 
of construction is so detailed that, while it is possible to discover various motifs 
and ideas, it would be a mistake to isolate them from the larger pattern which 
they make. 
This method of construction means that the student is faced with a vast 
amount of material. For this reason the scope of this thesis wi l l be limited to 
what might be called Barth's 'early theology1, that is to say, the material 
produced between the publication of the first edition of The Epistle to the 
Romans9 and the publication in 1931 of Barth's work on Anselm, Fides 
Ouaerens Intellectum.1 0 
The particular thread which this thesis wil l follow is his developing and 
deepening perception of the importance of ontology in the theologian's search 
for objective truth. It wil l be shown that it was this awareness which led Barth 
to turn away from the theology of his teachers and develop a unique theological 
perspective. For this reason large areas of his thought and writings wil l not be 
treated directly in the thesis. What is primarily under discussion is a problem of 
systematic theology. How can the theologian say, when speaking of God, "this 
is the case"? And i f he cannot speak of God in this way, then how can he speak 
of morality, society or any other sort of human endeavour? 
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For the same reason other sources wil l also be used in a selective way. 
Barth crossed swords with numerous contemporaries in his search for a new 
theological perspective, but again, the discussions which grew out of these 
disagreements wil l be used only in such a way as to reflect the particular 
emphasis of the thesis. This means that special attention wil l be drawn to the 
theology of Schleiermacher and Harnack because they provide pivotal examples 
of Barth's changing and growing theology. 
9 
THE BEGINNING 
This opening chapter wil l be concerned with the early years of Barth's 
theological development. It will briefly trace his time as a student and the 
influences upon his thinking. It will then move on to his first experience of ful l 
time parish ministry which began in 1911. The great change which occurred in 
Barth's theology has its roots in this period and owes its power to a combination 
of spiritual, theological, human and practical experiences. Therefore, a 
preliminary examination of these influences is important to the theme of this 
study. 
A brief reading of the biographical material for this period1 reveals an 
individual thoroughly at home with environment and thought. Barth's early 
years as a student in various university departments quite clearly laid a 
theological foundation which carried him through this period to the beginning of 
his pastorate. It would be a mistake to underestimate the impact which Barth's 
theological training had upon the course of his life. 
Barth was a student in the those years when theology in Switzerland and 
Germany was dominated by a legacy of nineteenth century thought.2 During this 
period the scholarship of Harnack was prominent, building upon and expanding 
that legacy with enthusiasm. Few could foresee the great turmoil that the next 
two decades were to bring. 
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History shows that the great age of Enlightenment theology had passed 
its zenith. During Barth's student days it was still vibrant, but on the decline. 
As a child of his age Barth was gripped by the great confidence of the period. 
He drank it in with gusto, happy to associate himself with the powerful and 
influential faculty at Marburg. 3 
The great challenge which faced the theologians of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was to discover an alternative to the scientific 
scepticism of preceding generations. Whilst it was obvious to everyone 
concerned that many of the certainties of medieval theology had not been able to 
withstand the serious challenge of men such as Hume and Kant, the Christian 
faith was not without its champions. Of these the greatest was undoubtedly 
Friedrich Schleiermacher. Even towards the end of his life Barth was never able 
to free himself from the influence of Schleiermacher, nor would he have wished 
to. This man, who fuelled so much of Barth's early thinking became his greatest 
adversary.4 
The Theology of Schleiermacher. 
Schleiermacher was a man of his age and never made any pretence at 
being anything else.3 As such he embraced the thought forms in use during his 
life time and used them as a critical tool with which to examine both existing 
religion and the cultural milieu in which he lived. For this reason his theology is 
based upon an "ontological substructure"6 borrowed from his cultural 
background and then re-applied in his own distinctive way. The application of 
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this rationale is used to create a preliminary understanding of the nature of 
reality. 7 Theological structures are then built upon that understanding.8 
In the first of his 'Speeches'9 Schleiermacher defined the nature of 
reality "only as an eternally prolonged play of opposing forces". 1 0 The nature of 
reality was determined by two differing forces constantly at play within each 
l i f e . 1 1 Schleiermacher saw in this play of opposing forces an inner unity which 
transcended any external diversity. While he acknowledged the extremes of 
experience at either pole, 1 2 he concluded that such extremes held a place within 
the whole by virtue of an innate necessity, that is, an inherent structure built 
into the nature of reality . This idea was based upon an accepted ontological 
framework borrowed from the literature and philosophy of his own day. 1 3 On 
this basis Schleiermacher asks the question, 
How shall these remote extremes be brought together in 
order to shape the long series into that closed ring that is 
the symbol of eternity and perfection?14 
It follows that Schleiermacher saw the world as a closed system in which 
perfection was attainable through the correct balance of finite and infinite 
aspects of reality. Therefore, a "common bond of consciousness"15 unified the 
diversity of humanity in such a way as to make the inherent nature of reality 
clear to all. Unity was brought about by the "deity" 1 6 who combined in certain 
people the play of finite and infinite in a more creative way. 1 7 
This means that certain individuals were able to draw to themselves the 
baser things of life, and then f i l l them with the spiritual nature of the infinite, so 
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creating a point of equilibrium between two contrasting states.18 This point 
showed itself most clearly in the creative parts of human life because an 
individual's creative drive was a direct result of "the flight of their spirit to the 
infinite". 1 9 
What Schleiermacher was expounding in these terms is a unification 
theory. 2 0 Perhaps it might be called a principle of inherent ontology. Clearly the 
underlying premise was that the world was a closed system in which diversity 
was overcome by the presence of the infinite. Such a unity was brought to 
Man's awareness through the actions of gifted individuals. Everything, 
therefore, had a place. There was always an inherent, i f unperceived, unity 
within diversity. The role of the gifted individual was to explain to the 
individual "the misunderstood voice of God, and reconcile him with the earth 
and with his place in i t . 2 1 
Underlying this understanding there is quite clearly a governing 
conception of the way in which God and Man related to each other. 
Schleiermacher saw this as characterised by what he came to term Man's 
"feeling of Dependence".22 God and Man were related by virtue of the latter 
having been created by the former. 2 3 Therefore, Schleiermacher could find no 
area of human life which is not religious because each moment was governed by 
this basic relationship of dependent need. 
Religion was seen exclusively in terms of relationship. Man was in 
relationship with God whether he chose to be or not. This was the overriding 
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factor which gives rise to the closed nature of Schleiermacher's thought. As he 
said himself, 
To these propositions assent can be unconditionally 
demanded; and no one wil l deny them who is capable of a 
little introspection and can find interest in the real subject 
of our present inquiries. 2 4 
Therefore, Man's relationship with God, because it was determined by a 
profound dependency, could never be broken. God was the "correlate"25 of 
Man's inherent religious self-consciousness.26 This meant that in 
Schleiermacher's theology there was a strong sense of continuity. Salvation 
history was characterised by a deepening awareness of this continuity and 
therefore of dependence. Sin is seen as anything which has "arrested"27 the 
development of Man's God-consciousness. 
What this meant in practice was a movement by the individual away 
from the desire for simple self-gratification towards a state in which every 
action was determined by the overriding impact of the infinite. Man's sense of 
sin was created by his inability to be governed by his higher state of 
conciousness.28 Schleiermacher's understanding of sin was dictated by the 
ontological sub-structure upon which he built his theology. This meant that sin 
could never become an absolute, a force in itself, because the consciousness of 
Man was never totally a monologue. There always existed a dialogue between 
two levels of awareness. In this way life was governed by a schema of "finite-
infinite". 2 9 
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An important aspect of the relationship between finite and infinite was 
that the point at which the finite became filled with infinity was not a point 
accessible to science. That is, that while such a point existed, only those of a 
higher nature could be aware of what was taking place. So Schleiermacher 
could say 
Only the thoughtful expert penetrates into the secrets of 
such a combination brought to rest; the individual 
elements in it are completely hidden for every common 
eye... 3 0 
What this did was to remove the point of theological enquiry from the 
normal realm of scientific knowledge. Therefore, theology as a scientific 
endeavour had to be allowed to dictate its own methods and frames of reference. 
This alternative realm of "knowledge" Schleiermacher designated as the realm 
of piety, being accessible only to the Christian as a man of piety. 3 1 
Therefore, the 'object' which presented itself to the theologian to be 
investigated was the "feeling" of religious piety which marked the life of the 
true Christian. 3 2 It was this feeling which characterised Man's highest 
endeavour because it denoted the point at which finite and infinite met. 
However, since the aim of culture was the exaltation of Man, how could this 
exaltation be achieved i f its possibility was denied by the culturally enlightened 
in their rejection of religion?3 3 
Schleiermacher saw secular scientific investigation as of necessity 
concerning itself with the physical world. In his view any real moment of 
15 
Vie Beginning 
human fulfilment was related not solely to things physical, but to their inter-play 
with the spiritual. Man's salvation rested upon his ability to pass beyond the 
particular and the physical, to the Universal and the Spiritual. 
It is the holy wedlock of the Universe with the Incarnated 
Reason for a creative, productive embrace. It is 
immediately raised above all error and 
misunderstanding.34 
The moment of unity between the finite and infinite was "above all 
error". 3 5 It occurred within the individual self-consciousness and therefore 
purely within the realm of feeling. 3 6 As such it was a sub-rational experience 
which bore no necessary resemblance to any thought or description.37 So, for 
Schleiermacher, objects and their natures were not the sphere of religion. It was 
the effects these objects cause in the individual which were at issue.38 
What this meant was that no external system could be imposed upon religion; 
it knows nothing of deducing and connecting... 
Everything is to be found immediately, and not proved 
from something else.39 
The realm of religion, and therefore of the theologian, was designated as an 
area accessible only along one very particular avenue of approach. This avenue 
was the life of religious piety. 
I f this understanding was correct then the role of Christianity in culture 
was to re-awaken those who have not experienced the spiritual unity which 
underlies external events. Man would remain i l l at ease as long as he was 
unaware of the ontological bond of finite and infinite. Christianity was a 
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message of salvation because it was able to correct this misunderstanding and 
direct the individual towards a deeper, inner, awareness of the Other.4 0 
In an age which prided itself on being of the highest cultural standing, it 
is easy to see what Schleiermacher was trying to say. I f the aim of all culture 
was the exaltation of Man, then how could this be achieved while Man remained 
trapped inside the finite aspects of life? Because the nature of Man was 
governed by the eternal dialogue of finite with infinite the quest for cultural 
exaltation was a religious quest whether or not it was acknowledged to be so by 
the champions of culture. 
This meant that Schleiermacher could advocate the road of religious 
piety as a route to exaltation. Christianity represented the zenith of cultural 
development, while culture represented the correct context of all truly religious 
endeavour. 
Religious awareness is irreducibly also self-awareness. 
And man, at the deepest level of his existence, is 
religious.4 1 
Therefore, exultation of the human spirit, in whatever context, is a religious 
theme. 
I f Schleiermacher was correct and Man does possess a natural disposition 
towards religious piety, what place is there, in this theology, for the person and 
work of Christ? Barth finds in Schleiermacher a definite Christology. But this 
does not mean that he remained uncritical. 
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Placed in the context of his own age Schleiermacher's thought clearly 
provided both an affirmation and a critique of culture . On the one hand he 
embraced the understanding of reality prevalent during his life time, giving to it 
a fresh interpretation. On the other, he admonished the cultural elite for 
imagining that true artistic expression could be attained without an awareness of 
the infinite. 4 2 
Schleiermacher was not willing to turn his back upon God in the 
glorification of the secular. His aim was to defend the Christian faith as the 
highest possible expression of all that was good in man and encourage his 
contemporaries in that expression. He wanted to unite the aspirations of man 
and the faith of the Church in such a way that neither was denigrated and both 
were enriched. 
In this sense he was, as Barth was later to point out with admiration, a 
man bound and committed to the world. 4 3 That is, he was a man of "culture" in 
an age when cultural development was held to be the highest of human ideals. 
As such he was both the product and master of his social heritage. For this 
reason Barth's feelings towards Schleiermacher are ambivalent. There is no 
doubt that he saw Schleiermacher's work as ultimately fruitless. 4 4 But in all of 
Barth's writings there is a deep respect born out of an appreciation of what 
Schleiermacher achieved in an age when religion was considered irrelevant to 
all but the most superstitious. 
18 
The Beginning 
Barth saw in Schleiermacher an honest attempt to remain a "theologian" 
when such an endeavour was to be an unworthy occupation.45 Barth's great 
criticism of nineteenth century theology was that in an attempt to prove itself 
relevant to its age, it brought together in an unrealistic fashion two disparate 
worlds. This might be attempted within the realm of the historical, 
psychological, or sociological. But wherever this was attempted it created what 
Barth came to see as an artificial and man-made symmetry. 
In the history of Protestant theology the nineteenth 
century brought with it the none too dignified sight of a 
general flight of those heads that were wisest, into the 
study of history. 4 6 
In Schleiermacher, Barth found a willingness to include God in the equation,47 
even though he could not help but see these attempts as inadequate. 
What also impressed Barth about Schleiermacher was, that while he 
gladly borrowed from his culture an ontological framework on which to build, 
he nonetheless tried to remain Christological in his thinking. In later years Barth 
was increasingly dissatisfied with the figure of Jesus who appeared in 
Schleiermacher's theology,48 but he was always impressed that he was there at 
a l l ; 4 9 
The Christology is the great disturbing element in 
Schleiermacher's doctrine of faith, not a very effective 
disturbance, perhaps, but a disturbance all the same.50 
In the acceptance and application of an ontological framework prior to 
any theological thinking Schleiermacher was clearly beginning with the 
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universal before moving on to the particular. By doing this he was able to 
include in his thought the whole panorama of social and cultural development, 
as well as the thread of religious piety which expresses the zenith of that 
development. It also meant that in subsequent theological thinking any form of 
Christology must be subject to the same universal conditions.51 Therefore, in 
Schleiermacher's thinking there had to exist in all circumstances, whether 
cultural or theological, a relationship between Jesus and ordinary men and 
women. 5 2 
In this context any movement for the 'Kingdom of God' meant the 
development of culture, since both were governed by the movement of Divine 
Providence experienced as historical necessity.53 In this context Christ stood as 
one amongst many. His exaltation consisted in the degree of his own religious 
piety, the extent to which he contained within his own person the unity of finite 
and infinite. His role as Redeemer was that of "assuming"54 Man into his own 
exalted state of religious piety. The role of Christianity was to make such a state 
of union possible.55 
Each one of us discerns in the birth of Christ his own 
higher birth through which nothing lives in him except 
love and devotion, through which even in him, the Eternal 
Son appears.56 
Salvation was characterised as a state of unity existing between the 
'world' and the 'Kingdom'. The point of unity was within the person of Jesus. 
The individual might come to share this unity. As such, piety as the outward 
sign of unification was the only true point of human and social exaltation. 
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While in Schleiermacher unity was only to be found through the Spirit, 5 7 
he also saw faith as having a social and cultural impact. 5 8 So it is that Barth can 
describe Schleiermacher's understanding of prayer as: 
...a crystallization of religious life into a particular act of 
life as such, which is forthwith dispersed and dissolved 
again after this concentration,59 so that.., the prayer of 
this moment is the anticipation of the enhanced wi l l for 
civilization of the next. 6 0 
As has already be shown, Schleiermacher's ontological scheme circled 
around the possibility of a unity between the finite and infinite. This point exists 
only within the realm of piety. As such it has a sub-rational content which 
denies any possibility of rational reflection because the spiritual must always be 
experienced in its immediacy. 
Schleiermacher himself acknowledged that any attempt to consider the 
nature of evil must involve the comparison of different aspects of the world. 6 1 
However, to follow the logic of his ontology any such comparison is still-born 
since the very act is enough in itself to rob the knowledge so derived of its 
immediacy. To compare is to balance in a rational way two differing things. 
This means that because Schleiermacher's understanding of true knowledge 
about the world is only obtained within the realm of feeling, i f knowledge of 
evil is of necessity always comparative, then it must always be incorrect. 
Only by comparing details could such an opposition 
appear to you. You must not contemplate anything alone, 
you must rather rejoice in everything in its own place.6 2 
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It follows that the existence of evil is only an apparent existence, caused 
by a failure to perceive the world, both physical and spiritual, as a "Whole". In 
this sense Schleiermacher could find no place in his theology for a truly radical 
conception of evil. This was for the same reason that Barth criticised his 
Christology, namely, that his presuppositions about ontology denied the 
possibility of evil existing as an independent reality. 
I f a loftier unity is to be suspected, along with the general 
tendency to order and harmony, there must be here and 
there situations not fully explicable.6 3 
The world is actually in a process of refinement. The irrationalities 
which present themselves to Man as aspects of evil are part of this process. A 
life, to be worthwhile, need only provide one meagre and fleeting moment of 
beauty. What is important is the overall pattern, of which this is but a part. 
The rude, the barbarian, the formless are to be absorbed 
and recast. Nothing is to be dead mass that moves only by 
impact and resists only by unconscious collision; all is to 
individual, connected, complex, exalted l i f e . 6 4 
Underlying this approach was a basic assumption that there existed a 
'Whole'. But of course, for this to be the case, Schleiermacher had to be able to 
perceive the unity of the world as an immediate experience. The idea of a 
'Whole' could not, according to his own standards, be a derived concept. Such 
knowledge had to grow out of an experience of unity. Perhaps, as Barth 
admitted, Schleiermacher did possess such a deep spirituality that for him this 
was indeed the case. But to share this point of view the individual had first to 
lay claim to an authoritative position over and above all others, and then insist 
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that such a position was accessible only along those lines which are 'visible' 
from where he stood. 
This was to all intents and purposes a closed argument, even i f its 
proponent claimed that the path of religious piety was in principle open to all. 
To accept this was to accept the opinion of one who was already 'above'. It is 
clear that Barth also saw this diff iculty. 6 3 
Since the culture of Schleiermacher's day did not understand the 
relevance of Christianity the primary need was for apologetic.66 To use 
apologetic in this context the individual had to adopt a position not only 'above' 
those to whom he spoke, but 'above' that about which he spoke. To quote 
Barth, 
Schleiermacher attacked the task of apologetics in the 
confidence that he knew what Christianity was, and could 
not be brought to depart from this basic feeling by Church 
doctrine, no matter how well established the latter was. 6 7 
In this Schleiermacher expressed the confidence of his own age. But 
what of the individual who finds that he is not the master or "virtuoso"6 8 of his 
world, but the victim and slave? It is a point of historical fact that this particular 
form of cultural confidence was brought into question by the happenings of the 
early twentieth century. The idea of Man 'above' was eclipsed by the horrors of 
war. 
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The Change of Direction. 
Karl Barth experienced both the confidence of the nineteenth century, 
and the devastation of the twentieth. The criticisms and comments just cited 
belong to Barth the great opponent of his theological forefathers. As such they 
came to expression some years after the beginning of the period under 
consideration. They are retrospective comments. To understand Barth in the 
decade beginning with the year 1910 he must be seen as a young pastor in the 
parish of Safenwil. The biographical material for this period 6 9 shows that the 
young pastor came under the influence of two overriding factors: the pressures 
of pastoral care, and the need to preach. 
Safenwil was an industrial parish. As such it was dominated by the 
various social issues associated with industrial work; conditions, wages, workers 
rights and so on. It was, by his own admission, the first time Barth had 
experienced "the concrete class conflict". 7 0 To begin with he tackled the 
problems he faced with the tools he had to hand, the theological methods and 
insights learned during his student days.71 He was by his own admission a 
"whole hearted Marburger",7 2 and this meant adhering to the two basic 
principals of "religious individualism" and "historical relativism". 7 3 The 
legitimate plurality of theological formulations corresponded to their 
verifiability through a present "personally experienced reality". 7 4 
It is not surprising that his early sermons were dominated by the 
theological ideas of Marburg; "life" and "experience".75 In one of his early 
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sermons he described himself to his congregation as "a guide to the sphere of 
the inner l i f e " . 7 6 Like many of his contemporaries he became interested in the 
Swiss religious socialist movement.77 This meant that he came into contact with 
the two theologians Hermann Kutter and Leonhard Ragaz. 
By the first of these two he was reminded to speak the word " 'God', 
earnestly, responsibly, and momentously".78 The power of God may confront 
and influence men in the midst of the secular and profane, as well as in the 
realm of the ecclesiastical.79 In a different but similar form we see here 
Schleiermacher's conception of the 'Kingdom' as something which is 
synonymous not only with the life of the Church, but with society and culture. 
In this vein, Barth could associate himself with some of the views of 
Ragaz in his suggestion that the acceptance of socialism was at least a 
preliminary step towards the embracing of God's Kingdom: "Jesus is the social 
movement, and the social movement is Jesus in the present".80 Barth did not 
hold on to this position for long. To discover why, it is necessary to look at the 
other great influence upon him at this time; the need to preach. 
Barth's outlook on preaching he expressed in a lecture which he gave 
some years after becoming the Pastor in Safenwil. It illustrates the dilemma he 
faced in those early years; 
The question wil l no longer down, but breaks out in 
flame: is it true?.... Is it true, this talk of a loving and 
good God, who is more than one of the friendly idols 
whose rise is so easy to account for, and whose dominion 
is so brief? What people want to find out and thoroughly 
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understand is, Is it true?.... So they come to us, entering 
into the whole grotesque situation of Sunday morning, 
which is only the expression of the possibility raised to a 
high power. 8 1 
The question would no longer down. 'Is it true?1 This quotation shows how 
problematic this question had become for Barth . 
Previously he had defended, with great gusto, the pastoral strengths of 
the theology he had learnt in Marburg. 8 2 But it is quite clear that when the 
pressures of pastoral care became real in a new and challenging way, the old 
learning simply would not do. For the first time in his life Barth was confronted 
by the sheer tedium of everyday existence.83 There was a realisation that 
salvation is not only the exaltation of humanity but also the overcoming of 
humanity;84 and what this viewpoint required was an understanding of a God 
such that this could be achieved. 
In Schleiermacher's conception of the universal nature of religion, 
salvation, as with other aspects of the religious life, had become a matter of 
degree. No man ever stood quite outside the circle of religious consciousness or 
was incapable of playing a part in the continuing dialogue of finite and infinite. 
Al l men stood in relation to God because they always stood in relation their own 
religious 'feelings'. Faith was but a particular form of the developed human 
spirit. 8 5 This was Schleiermacher's religious a priori. 
The problem which this approach caused is basic to the ontology which 
Schleiermacher chose to apply. I f a theology is developed from the viewpoint of 
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the 'universal' and has as its aim the exaltation of Man, then evil takes the form 
of a negation. In other words, men do not choose evil, they simply fail to 
choose what is 'best'. To belong to a universal scheme to which all possibilities 
must correspond means that whatever decisions are made, both they, and the 
individual that makes them, remain within the scheme. While decisions might 
prove to be negative in a limited context they can never take the form of a 
decision outside the universally applicable rule. They may be a negative eddy in 
the flow of things, but they wil l not overcome it. As subject to the whole, 
decisions can never be positively destructive. 
For Barth, in those early years in Safenwil, struggling as he was with the 
social and political issues of his small industrial town, the impression of evil as 
a positive force had become an overriding consideration. He realised that his 
parishioners needed a God who could not only exalt their own humanity, but 
also overcome the inhumanity of those who managed the factories in which they 
worked. In the face of pastoral issues in Safenwil, Man had become a problem: 
"Man is a riddle and nothing else, and his universe, be it ever so vividly seen 
and felt, is a question.86 
The question would no longer down. "Is it true?" Is the average 
experience of people good or bad? Is it true that the movement through life is 
one of exaltation and development? Is it one of struggle and hardship? The 
'universal' nature of the world so often seems to enslave and not exalt. Corrupt 
governments destroy human rights and dignity. People are forced to live in 
slums and work in slave shops. So often Man's relationships enslave and deface 
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what is good. I f Man is indeed wrapped in a universal movement then it is at 
best problematic as to whether that movement wi l l result in His exaltation. On 
occasion, even to suggest such a thing is in itself an obscenity. 
Barth met in Safenwil people for whom the question "Is it true?" was a 
living and important question, a question to which there could be no easy 
answer. The young Pastor struggled to find in the socialist movement of his day 
a suitable remedy for the hurts of those under his care. 
What becomes clear is that Barth knew himself to be surrounded by the 
"realm of the imperfect".8 7 Any theology which he subsequently developed was 
never intended as a means of escape. Even at this stage he was concerned with 
the "particularity"8 8 of history. His parish experience forced him to move away 
from any idea of the 'universal1. 
The weakness of Schleiermacher's theology lay in its underlying doctrine 
of God. In his emphasis upon the spiritual and infinite, Schleiermacher had 
created a God incapable of identifying with the imperfect. His God was the God 
of "an uneschatological 'Christianity of the present'",89 a universal principle, 9 0 
"not a God who can have compassion".91 
Barth's affiliation to the Social Democratic Party9 2 illustrates his 
growing desire to address the whole of Man's existence.93 Pietism had given 
rise to a purely individual hope,9 4 and so presented Christianity as a 
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development of culture. 9 5 Its only frame of reference was the human spirit and 
those forms of reality "co-existent with it in its self-consciousness".96 
The greatest weakness in Schleiermacher's theology was caused by its 
creators desire to identify so closely with the ontology of his age. The theology 
which developed in both Germany and Switzerland shared this weakness.97 
Barth ultimately rejected the Social Democratic movement because he saw it 
leading back to its own form of secularization.98 
The beginning of the First World War was a deeply upsetting moment 
for Barth. But worse was to fol low. 9 9 On 1st August 1914 ninety three German 
intellectuals issued a manifesto supporting the war policy of Wilhelm I I . 
Amongst these were some of Barth's theological teachers. In this one moment 
the growing discontent which he had been feeling came into stark focus. Things 
simply could not go on as before. 1 0 0 
It was like the twilight of the gods when I saw the 
reaction of Harnack, Herrmann, Rade, Eucken and 
company to the new situation,... and discovered how 
religion and scholarship could be changed completely.... 
into intellectual 42 centimetre cannons.101 
Barth saw that all these men had become hopelessly compromised by the 
political situation. Their "ethical failure" indicated that "their exegetical and 
dogmatic presuppositions" could not be in order. 1 0 2 It was the ethical failure of 
the existing theology which finally pushed Barth beyond the point of no 
return. 1 0 3 Surprising, then, that in later years he was accused of being 
uninterested in the world and its problems. 1 0 4 Barth needed a fresh start. 
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The War highlighted the weakness of Schleiermacher's method in 
applying a universal ontological principle. He had claimed the rights of a 
virtuoso of religion, the right to express in his own terms and medium the 
content of religion. The right to stand above religion as the master of its 
meaning and expression. But to suggest the existence of a universal framework 
meant that an explanation for all situations could be found. Barth felt that the 
theologies of Schleiermacher and his other teachers failed conclusively at the 
point where ethical responses were required to face the horrors of war. The war 
could not simply be explained as a temporal 'blip' in the relationship of finite 
and infinite. Man as a question loomed large, and as a corollary, the question of 
God loomed larger. 
Together with his good friend Thurneysen, Barth realised that what was 
needed was a 'wholly other' theological foundation, 1 0 5 but in the beginning 
neither of them had any real idea what this might mean. They thought of 
exploring Kant and Hegel, 1 0 6 but rejected both. Eventually it was the 'obvious' 
which suggested itself. Together they turned to the Bible. 
In preparation for this work of preaching he sat down 
before the Bible each day of the week and in his own new 
way ploughed it like a farmer who goes out into his fields 
in the early morning and makes furrow after fur row. 1 0 7 
The impact of reading the Bible was enormous. Into the theological 
vacuum, created for Barth by the Great War, poured the witness of Holy 
Scripture. He felt gripped by the Bible in a new and powerful way. 1 0 8 But then 
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what did he discover that he had not already seen? Thurneysen explains it in this 
way: 
Karl Barth read from the Scriptures the message of the 
holy, gracious and righteous God who needs no defence, 
who lets his Word go forth in its sovereignty and who can 
and wil l be known from this Word of his, and from it 
alone. But this Word of his is called, and is, Jesus Christ, 
the one around whom the years in their thousands stand 
still because he is the centre of all time, the bringer of the 
kingdom which with him dawns in the midst of this time 
as the new world of God. 1 0 9 
In two lectures which he delivered in the years 1916-17, "The 
Righteousness of God", and "The Strange New World Within the Bible" , 1 1 0 this 
theme of the 'otherness' of God was explored. 1 1 1 What Barth discovered was 
the 'subjectivity' of God. That meant God's freedom not to be conformed to 
any human structure or pattern of thought. This was essential to his nature as 
God. 1 1 2 I f Man imposed his own identity upon God then He simply spoke of 
himself, "in a loud voice". 1 1 3 
Barth chose, as a direct result of his Biblical studies, to suggest the 
existence of an independent world. The Bible simply presented mankind with a 
radically different understanding of reality. In this sense the 'Righteousness of 
God' was quite independent of any human righteousness. The Bible said nothing 
of man's goodness, but a great deal about his arrogance. Properly understood, it 
did not allow itself to be questioned by Man . 1 1 4 
It is not the right human thoughts about God which form 
the content of the Bible, but the right divine thoughts 
about men. The Bible tells us not how we should talk with 
God, but what he says to us. 1 1 5 
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Barth began to build upon the basic premise that there existed in Man no 
natural religious capacity. The world of God was not simply the human world 
drawn large. What struck home was the very questionable nature of the 
wor ld . 1 1 6 Schleiermacher's confidence was not the norm. The norm was a life 
of uncertainty, change and decay. The world was characterised by the one 
impossible and yet all important question; "Is it true?" Is it true that amidst the 
storms of life, the vagaries of relationships, the duplicity of governments, there 
was a spirit and existence which was still, and peaceful and true to itself? The 
answer which Barth discovered in the Bible was a resounding and deafening 
"Yes". 
But now into the midst of this sense of need and 
apprehension, as restless and unbroken as the theme of a 
Bach fugue, comes the assurance of conscience - No, it is 
not true! There is above this warped and weakened wil l of 
yours and mine, above this absurd and senseless wil l of 
the world, another which is straight and pure , and which, 
when it once prevails, must have other, wholly other, 
issues than we see today. 1 1 7 
What was expressed in this passage was the realisation for Barth of the 
subjective freedom of God. Schleiermacher had considered the nature of God 
only as it related to the finite-infinite schema of thought which he used. In this 
sense God became a dominant principle inherent in the ontological structures of 
life. In contrast, Barth found in the Bible a God who speaks in freedom and 
authority out of his own inner nature. 
What Barth discovered in the Scriptures, as Thurneysen explained, was a 
God who "spoke". From this moment on his theology was governed by a desire 
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to hear the "Word of God" addressed to Man before it had been sifted and 
diluted by a predetermined interpretative model. 1 1 8 
In Schleiermacher's theology the freedom of God had been sacrificed on 
the altar of cultural necessity. His idea of a Platonic 1 1 9 'principle' was so 
different to Barth's growing perception of the "righteous God who needs no 
defence". In Schleiermacher's scheme there could be no real freedom because 
all considerations were subservient to the rational necessity of a particular 
ontological model built around the understood relationship of finite-infinite. 
Schleiermacher's commitment to the principle of cultural exaltation 
meant that, ironically, his understanding of Man proved restrictive. He 
produced a "dogmatics of the religious man" 1 2 0 which had its starting point in 
the depths of Man's own soul. This in turn produced a "Protestant to Roman 
semi-Pelagianism".121 In contrast, Barth came to see the life of Man as 
intelligible only at the point where he heard himself addressed by God. There 
needed to be a clarification of the relationship between Man's piety and the 
Word of God. 1 2 2 
The discovery which Barth made set him free from the need to create his 
own interpretive ontology. 1 2 3 He set out upon a theological journey which was 
to occupy the rest of his life. It was a journey committed to the world, but also, 
and most importantly, to the sovereign Will of God as expressed in his Word. 1 2 4 
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Overbeck and Blumhardt. 
Perhaps in this expression of Barth's understanding there is a trace of 
hindsight. The mature expression of this theology was to lie many years ahead. 
In the period of his pastorate, and with the writing of The Epistle to the 
Romans, he began the struggle to free himself from the burden of nineteenth 
century theology. 1 2 5 This task involved him in an attempt to articulate afresh the 
freedom of God, in distinction to the world which he had made. To this end he 
was greatly influenced by the thought of Franz Overbeck and Christoph 
Blumhardt. 
As a New Testament scholar, Overbeck cut a strange figure in the 
academic world of the nineteenth century. As a great opponent of the liberal 
theology of his own age he insisted that its development signified not growth but 
painful demise. What Overbeck provided for Barth was a clear articulation of 
the impotency of culturally bound Protestantism. Barth had sensed it in its 
ethical failure of 1914. Overbeck illustrated it in large, bold letters. It was the 
diagnosis of the end of Christianity which captured Barth's imagination. 1 2 6 
The central point of Overbeck's theology concerned the early 
expectations of those who proclaimed the Gospel. His premise was that all New 
Testament proclamation had to be understood as hinging upon the expected 
immanent dissolution of both history and culture. 1 2 7 Therefore, modern 
theology, i f it was to express the character and beliefs of early Christianity, had 
to contain a powerfully eschatological element.1 2 8 
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From this standpoint it is obvious why Overbeck should attack the 
theology of his day. Schleiermacher had tried to unify theology and culture with 
the common thread of human exaltation. To fu l f i l such an aim he had become a 
"virtuoso" of his subject. To Overbeck such attempts simply illustrated the basic 
denial of the eschatological nature of faith. This was a "betrayal"1 2 9 of 
Christianity by subordinating it to historical necessity. 
Overbeck argued that i f there was to be a point of unity in the relation of 
God to Man, it could not be created in an artificial way by making "faith" and 
"knowledge" synonymous terms: 1 3 0 
The nature of modern Christianity... is therefore 
denatured, because in it the tension of contradiction is 
transformed into a normal relationship which must result 
in the corruption of both parts - humanity and 
Christianity. 1 3 1 
He accused contemporary theology of measuring the strengths of a text against 
its relation to a particular historical method 1 3 2 (a theme which will be 
considered in Barth's debate with Harnack). As Overbeck put it, 
It pretends to preserve the life of the holy texts from 
which it draws its life, and by so doing only throws sand 
into the eyes of the world. But this is precisely what true 
scholarship would never pretend to do, since it cannot 
ever create l i f e . 1 3 3 
For Overbeck the Christian witness could not gain its strength from any 
cultural, exegetical, or historical source. Rather its vitality came from the power 
at work in God's purposes for the world, even i f that power meant the 
dissolution of the world and all things "theological". In this regard Overbeck 
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saw the role of exegesis as freeing the individual "from the text" 1 3 4 so that he 
might hear what lay within it. 
In asserting the eschatological nature of faith, Overbeck denied the 
existence of an inherent point of contact between God and Man within society, 
culture or history. A l l these in themselves proved irrelevant to true Christianity. 
There could be no inherent point of correspondence between the world and the 
salvation of God. In these terms salvation meant the dissolution of the world in 
order that it might be re-established on a different basis. Therefore, rightly 
understood, Christianity stood as a radical contradiction, not only to the 
Church, but also to the wor ld . 1 3 5 
Therefore, the world was characterised by two things; death 1 3 6 and 
'Urgeschichte1.1 3 7 The second of these two terms Overbeck used to describe the 
distant eschatological realm towards which the world was moving. 'Super-
History' formed the boundary, the contradiction and the hope of the world. 
Death as the characteristic feature of life likewise formed a boundary, but a 
boundary which could also become a doorway. Therefore, Christianity provided 
a radical hope for the world only in so far as it allowed the contradiction 
inherent in the relationship between the world and Urgeschichte to be heard as a 
deep and unequivocal "No!" . 1 3 8 
I f this understanding is developed then eschatology is not simply 
concerned with a future historical event, but with an inherent contradiction, an 
ontological disparity, between the nature of God and the world he has made. 
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The dissolution of the world is not simply a future event towards which the 
world is moving, but a current event which takes place at the points where Man 
allows himself and his world to be contradicted by the living presence of 
God. 1 3 9 
Overbeck saw the role of the Church as nourishing and maintaining this 
metaphysical contradiction. Unfortunately, it was a role which he felt the 
Church failed to perform. Instead he saw it as becoming another aspect of the 
temporal realm. As such it was dead. 
I f Christianity, then not history; i f history then not 
Christianity. Historic Christianity - that is Christianity 
subjected to time - is an absurdity... And... History is an 
abyss into which Christianity has been thrown wholly 
against its w i l l . 1 4 0 
In the attempts of nineteenth century theologians to defend the Christian faith 
Overbeck saw an increase in its decline; 
Do the modern theologians think that they can put off 
much longer with their absurd delusion that Christianity's 
best defence to ensure continued existence is its unlimited 
capacity for change?141 
What Barth found in Overbeck was the clear articulation of an 
eschatological theology. The problem with this was that it stressed the otherness 
of God to the exclusion of any relational aspects of his nature. Because Barth 
had discovered in the Scriptures a God who addressed the world through his 
living Word, a God who sought a relationship with his creation, the idea of 
ontological distance could not provide the only content of theology. What he 
37 
The Beginning 
needed was a theology that could unite the ontological freedom of God and the 
limited aspects of humanity. 
In these terms it was the Blumhardts, father and son, who provided the 
theological impetus needed to overcome the restrictive aspects of Overbeck's 
thinking. He was introduced to their thinking by his friend Thurneysen.1 4 2 
Overbeck1 s critique of nineteenth century theology had been aimed at its 
easy marriage of eschatology and history. His critique was essentially polemical 
and retrospective. The force of his argument grew out a study of early 
Christianity with its eschatological preaching and teaching. What he failed to do 
was provide any form of positive statement to fill the crater his own arguments 
had made. 
Barth found in the work of the two Blumhardts a no less powerful 
eschatology, but this time looking forward and not back. He did not see this as 
a theology as such because neither father nor son showed any desire to enter 
into the theological debate on any of the accepted theological grounds.1 4 3 
Nonetheless, Barth saw in the thinking of the Blumhardts a "direct and 
penetrating Word from God into the wor ld" . 1 4 4 His own contemporaries might 
ignore this "Word"only at their peril. 
Barth was deeply impressed with Christoph Blumhardt as a man. This is 
something which leaps out of the page at anyone who studies what Barth had to 
say about him. A man "not to be studied but only experienced".145 So much of 
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Barth's later theology carries the imprint of those meetings during the early 
months of 1915. 1 4 6 This is a fact which few commentators, with the notable 
exception of Eberhard Jungel, seem to acknowledge. 
To describe Blumhardt and his thinking, Barth used two words, 
"priestly" 1 4 7 and "organic", 1 4 8 which he saw as being interchangeable. In this 
way he tried to explain how Blumhardt was able to combine within himself the 
affirmation of the world so sought after by Schleiermacher, with the 
eschatological critique so powerfully articulated by Overbeck. Blumhardt was 
able to 
represent God's cause in the world yet not wage war on 
the world, love the world and yet be completely faithful to 
God, suffer with the world and speak a frank word about 
its need and at the same time go beyond this to speak the 
redeeming word about the help it waits f o r . . . 1 4 9 
Blumhardt's whole outlook upon life and theology began, as Barth 
described it, with "God's presence, might and purpose".1 5 0 For this reason 
theology could proceed from the starting point of God's revelation of himself, 
but not otherwise.1 5 1 This is a quite unpietistic standpoint152 because God is not 
conceived as a religious a priori. It is in marked contrast to the theology of 
Schleiermacher.153 He saw the object of theological enquiry as being the 
religious feeling of absolute dependence instilled in Man as the symptom of his 
correct relationship to God. In Blumhardt Man is not understood in terms of his 
feelings but in the way in which he relates to 
the great cosmic movements in heaven and on earth, all in 
the same glory of God. And within these mighty outlines 
lie the little things too, even those concerning the smallest 
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midge, the sparrows, and the flowers. The same great 
power encompasses them a l l . 1 3 4 
Blumhardt painted with expansive and powerful strokes an enormous 
picture of cosmic proportions. This was not a theology based upon culturally 
based ontology. The truth of reality in its relation to God was not understood to 
be buried within the created order. It existed in the free will and purposes of 
God as he decided to engage with the world he had created. Therefore, theology 
was a discipline which at its root was dependent upon the revelation of God as 
an act of freedom and sovereignty. Blumhardt would never have described 
himself as a virtuoso of religion. 
Because Blumhardt could find the meaning of reality in the wil l and 
nature of God he could also perceive a wholeness to the direction and flow of 
history. This meant that he is able to see the limited nature of the temporal at 
the same time as perceiving its ultimate fulfilment in the purposes of God. 1 5 5 
In the development of Barth's theology, Blumhardt and Overbeck go 
together. 
They stood next to each other..., back to back, i f you 
like, differing greatly in habit, vocabulary, in their 
conceptual worlds, in experience, but together in 
substance - Blumhardt as the forward-looking, hopeful 
Overbeck, Overbeck as the backward-looking critical 
Blumhardt, each as a witness for the other's mission. 1 5 6 
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While Blumhardt provided Barth with the vision to reach beyond the theological 
limitations of the nineteenth century, Overbeck provided the academic edge he 
needed to cut himself loose. 1 5 7 
The positive content which Blumhardt brought to the theological stage 
came to be expressed for Barth in the concept of the 'Kingdom of God ' . 1 5 8 By 
the use of this phrase he wished to identify 
an Other which not only defines the boundaries of the 
world and illuminates it from beginning to end in all its 
dimensions, but which also breaks into the world and 
shakes it with superior strength and goodness... The Other 
to which they looked... existed in its coming... 1 5 9 
This was the clearest of rejection of any possible theological inherency. 
God was seen as distinct from the world he had made. He was to be 
encountered at those points where he broke into the world and never simply 
waiting within it. Blumhardt understood God as someone who "comes" because 
of the person and work of Jesus. He saw the risen Lord as a "real, quite 
specific, agent".1 6 0 The resurrection marked the point at which God defined 
both himself in his freedom and sovereignty, and the created world in which he 
chose to be known. 
Blumhardt's theology was profoundly Christological because it hinged 
upon the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. 
The crucified one, who is the risen one, is the Lord.. . 
Therefore all knees must bend before Him and all tongues 
must confess that Jesus Christ is the Lord. There cannot 
be any creature either in heaven or under the earth which 
is anything beside Him. For this we live and strive. 1 6 1 
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The whole relationship of God to the world was defined by this single 
act. The unity of God and Man was given not as a blanket condition, but at a 
moment of grace and freedom spontaneously created by God himself. 1 6 2 The 
resurrection was a sign of this determining factor. 
Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that Schleiermacher found it so 
difficult to include in his theology the resurrection of Jesus. Before he ever got 
close to the empty tomb he had defined his terms of reference in respect to his 
cultural setting. This meant that a happening of such extra-ordinary dimensions 
came to be expressed in symbolic terms. Because Schleiermacher thought it 
necessary to use a form of ontological under-pinning, then 'objectivity' as a 
term of reference had to prove limited. No 'object' could be allowed to define 
itself. Freedom existed only within the sphere of ontological reference 
previously defined. Therefore, all 'freedom' was a product of ontology. In this 
respect evil became only an apparent disturbance within a pre-defined 
ontological unity. 
Blumhardt differed markedly from this because he was not hindered by 
any pre-existent ontological framework. Indeed his sole point of reference was 
an act of freedom, an example of an object defining itself; in this case the object 
being God. This meant that for Blumhardt theological investigation was an act 
of free wi l l . In Schleiermacher this could not be the case because Man was 
inherently religious. Like it or not every individual was 'inside' the theological 
question. The key to understanding was recognition of this truth. For Blumhardt 
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theology began with the suspension and then re-definition of ontology by an act 
of God's free grace. 
There can be little doubt that Schleiermacher was expressing in his 
thinking a basic human desire to find a pattern in life. Barth was struggling with 
this same problem in his early theological essays.163 But the question remains, 
in what way does life possess a unity of purpose and meaning? Schleiermacher 
perceived a spiritual unity. Blumhardt addresses the problem from a wholly 
different perspective. 
Barth expresses Blumhardt's position in this way, 
The contrast was not between Jesus and the unconverted 
heart of man, but the real power of darkness in which 
man finds himself. This was what the struggle was about, 
at it was here that Jesus proved victorious. 1 6 4 
Blumhardt's early experience of the deliverance of Gottliebin Dittus 1 6 5 had 
convinced him of the fact that Jesus was the conqueror. The eschatological 
nature of reality was shown with the coming of Jesus. To Blumhardt, 
eschatology simply meant the out-pouring of God's power and sovereignty into 
the life of Man. The breaking in of such power from above exposed both the 
limitations of creation and God's ultimate determination to rescue that which 
could not save itself. 
Help will be delayed, and misery wil l not be overcome, 
until the barriers between eternity and this world are 
broken through. A hole must be made from above 
downwards, and not from beneath upwards.1 6 6 
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Blumhardt saw the notion of the 'Kingdom of Heaven' as having three 
dimensions. There was the reality of the resurrected Jesus working in the lives 
of ordinary men and women to heal and transform l i f e . 1 6 7 Blumhardt found in 
the concrete events of history signs of the Kingdom. There was also the 
expectation of a "general outpouring of the Holy Spiri t" . 1 6 8 Finally, there was 
the looked for final arrival of God's sovereign power within the course of world 
events.1 6 9 
Blumhardt's theology had the same polemical feel as that of Overbeck 
but he moved beyond Overbeck with a hope and expectancy that the latter could 
never share. Overbeck saw with clarity the ontologically unique nature of God 
and this knowledge provided the foundation of his critique. However, 
Blumhardt moved beyond this simple recognition to see also the power and 
purposes of God emanating, not only from his unique ontology, but also from 
his sovereign will for Mankind. It is this difference in understanding which gave 
to Blumhardt's thinking its hope and vision. 
It also meant that, unlike Schleiermacher who borrowed an ontology 
from his own culture, Blumhardt saw the rationality of world history as buried 
within the purposes of God. In other words, reality was only intelligible when 
seen in relation to God's wi l l , which meant in relation to his power. Therefore, 
the reality of the resurrection was the point around which all other forms of 
supposed truth must circle. Barth said of Blumhardt's ideas 
their truth-content breaks into pieces in being applied to 
the subject-matter with which they are concerned. Neither 
individually nor in a system do they make sense unless 
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sense is sought in the direction in which they are 
aimed. 1 7 0 
Blumhardt saw the world as ontologically distinct from God, but never free 
from his sovereign wi l l . He accepted the fact of Man's ontological freedom, 
while seeing that freedom as encompassed by God's ultimate purpose. 
In Schleiermacher there was only the one frame of reference; that of 
ontology. This was because God had already determined that it should be so. 
The ontological structure of reality was a given. Therefore, Man was already 
'inside'. There could be no 'outside', only a failure to recognise the fact. 
In Blumhardt's theology Man's knowledge of God was based upon an 
act of God's self-revelation born of his own freedom. God was free of Man by 
virtue of his ontological nature and sovereignty. Therefore, while Man shared in 
this ontological freedom, he was at the same time subject to God's wi l l . In 
Blumhardt's theology there was both an 'inside' and an 'outside'. 'Outside' in 
relation to ontology; 'inside' in relation to purpose. The question which Man 
had to answer was whether he would choose to exercise his ontological freedom 
to follow the purposes of God. 1 7 1 
This was why in Blumhardt's thinking evil could take on harsher and 
darker forms than in Schleiermacher. There was no form of ontological 
restriction to prevent the growth of evil. Its limits were drawn solely by the 
ultimate purposes of God's sovereign will and it could grow and expand up to 
this limit, but never beyond it. So Barth could say of Blumhardt that 
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He sees the tragedy of life very clearly, but he does not 
take it tragically, so to speak. Not for a moment does the 
tragedy of life become an independent object of his 
interest; it lies embedded from the very beginning in the 
peace of God as it were. 1 7 2 
Therefore, in the development of Barth's thinking Blumhardt's theology 
provided an antidote to the culturally limited perspective of Schleiermacher. 
While Overbeck's polemic gave Barth the critical tools he needed to dismantle 
the theology of his predecessors, it was Blumhardt who allowed him to move 
away from mere critique toward the development of a positive theological 
alternative.1 7 3 
However, the possibility of such an alternative lay well in the future. 
Before then Barth had to struggle with a problem which Blumhardt, in his 
theological naivety, had not even considered. To say that the ultimate nature of 
reality is dependent upon the sovereignty of God is one thing, but to discern the 
wil l and purpose at work in the exercising of such sovereignty is something 
quite different. This has to be determined, otherwise Man must simply 
accommodate himself to the will of a distant and blank-faced entity whose 
motives remain uncertain, and whose ultimate purpose need not be good. 
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Barth's movement away from the theology of his predecessors, towards 
a new way of thinking, did not prove easy. It involved him at various times in 
heated and passionate debate. These debates provide points of reference by 
which it is possible to assess the changes which his thought underwent during 
those formative years. 
One of the notable conflicts of the 1920's involved Barth in a debate 
with his former teacher Adolf von Harnack. It took place in the pages of Die 
Christliche Welt.' In the early months of 1923 the two opponents exchanged a 
series of letters, beginning with Harnack's 'Fifteen Questions to the Despisers 
of Scientific Theology'.2 
The debate was spawned by a previous meeting in April 1920 when they 
both presented papers at the Aarau Student Conference.3 Barth delivered his 
now famous piece entitled, 'Biblical Questions, Insights and Vistas'.4 From 
Harnack's comments at the time, 5 and those he made in future months,6 it is 
quite clear that the two men were separated by a vast gulf stretching between 
two quite different understandings of the role and nature of theology. This gulf 
was never bridged. But the debate at least provided the occasion for the first 
real public encounter between Barth's thought and the theological heritage 
which he opposed. 
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In Barth's essays written during this period the themes which have 
already been discussed in relation to Schleiermacher, Overbeck and Blumhardt 
begin to find expression.7 The address given at the Aarau conference in 1920 
provided the occasion for the ensuing debate. But the ideas in that debate simply 
reflect theological themes to be found in other pieces of Barth's work. 
Reading the early Barth is not unlike studying the writings of Blumhardt. 
The former is far more critical and the material is constructed differently. But 
on the whole many themes and ideas are shared in common. Blumhardt "simply 
tells us the divine truth in the world as it meets him". 8 His is not the world of 
the theologian. Barth, on the other hand, is arguing a case in the field of 
academic theology. Therefore, it is not surprising that while Blumhardt is 
content to concern himself in random form with the problems of life, Barth's 
thoughts are more accurately and precisely directed. In those early years it was 
to the Bible that Barth turned his thoughts. 
It has already been shown, with reference to the comments of 
Thurneysen, that Barth found the inspiration for theological growth within the 
pages of Scripture. What he found clearly disturbed and excited him. With a 
consistency of purpose he explored in those early years the nature of the Biblical 
witness and its treatment by his contemporaries. He began his exploration from 
a simple starting point, a single question: "What is there within the Bible?".9 
He answered his own question in an essay entitled "The Strange New 
World Within the Bible". 1 0 In the course of this piece he examined in the light 
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of what he had learned from Blumhardt the nature of God's interaction with 
Man. Not unlike Schleiermacher, he was exploring the whole question of unity, 
the unity of God with his world. 
As in Blumhardt, it is easy to find the idea of ontological distinction, 
carried and subsumed within the overall sovereignty of God. Barth was 
articulating in his own way the eschatological dimension found in Blumhardt. 
By this he meant the 'ultimate' or 'absolute' dimension to life. It is this 
eschatological character of reality which he found so clearly expressed in the 
pages of the Bible. 1 1 
Barth was clear in his own mind that the Biblical criticism of his 
opponents had foundered upon a failure to recognise this single point. In an 
extended argument he examined the attempts made by scholars to find in 
Scripture only the expression of either historical,1 2 moral 1 3 or religious1 4 ideas. 
A l l these he rejected on the grounds that they failed to see what lay beneath the 
"crust"15 of human expression. I f there existed in the Bible a unity of purpose, 
understanding and meaning, then it was not to be found by applying to the text a 
pre-defined scheme of interpretation. This would in its own way simply reflect 
the method of Schleiermacher which he had already rejected. 
Instead, he insisted that the nature of the eschatological message in the 
Bible provided both its own question, and its own answer to that same question. 
It was not Man who should question the Bible, but the Bible which questioned 
Man. 1 6 In this sense 
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There is a river in the Bible that carries us away, once we 
have entrusted our destiny to i t . . . The Holy Scriptures 
will interpret themselves in spite of all our human 
limitations. We need only dare to follow this drive, this 
spirit, this river, to grow out beyond ourselves towards 
the highest answer.17 
What Barth was saying is that, as with Blumhardt, there is a sense in 
which Man is both 'inside' and 'outside' the Biblical question. Inside, in so far 
as the experiences described in the Bible happened to men and women no 
different to those of the present age. Outside, because the Bible is not only 
talking about Man's experience of the world, but that experience as it relates to 
God's sovereign wil l and power. 1 8 
When Barth chose to speak about eschatology he meant the power of 
God entering into the world as something distinct and quite unique. Therefore, 
the Bible correctly understood was not about history, morality or religion. It 
was concerned with the purposes of God 1 9 as they impact upon the life of Man. 
It is not the right human thoughts about God which form 
the content of the Bible, but the right divine thoughts 
about men. 2 0 
Therefore, in Barth's thinking, the unity of Man with God lay not in 
some pre-determined ontological framework, but solely within the wil l of God. 
In this sense the concepts of sovereignty, eschatology and unity cannot be 
separated in his thinking. Life became eschatological when the power of God 
broke into the normal ontological framework in order that he might exert his 
authority. Such authority then gave to an otherwise disparate and ontologically 
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fragmented world a unity not its own. For this reason the Biblical question was 
simply concerned with how Man wil l respond to the sovereignty of God. 2 1 
As with Schleiermacher, Barth was trying to deal with the problem of 
unity. In a previous essay22 he identified the need of Man to find a unity with 
God. 
But now into the midst of this sense of need and 
apprehension, as resistless and unbroken as the theme of a 
Bach fugue, comes the assurance of conscience - No, it is 
not true! There is above this warped and weakened wil l of 
yours and mine, above this absurd and senseless wil l of 
the world, another which is straight and pure, and which, 
when once it prevails, must have other, wholly other, 
issues than these we see today. 2 3 
There is here an apprehension of something great and purposeful hovering upon 
the edge of Man's perceptions of the world, like "the tremors of an earthquake 
or like the ceaseless thundering of the ocean".24 The unity which Barth was 
trying to find quite clearly lies above and beyond Man. This is not a unity 
inherent in the world, but waits upon its edge to break in from outside. It is 
Man's need of this unity which Barth identified as characteristic of his 
existence. 
In this sense the question of unity and the question of Man's attitude to 
God's sovereignty went hand in hand. In fact, in Barth's way of thinking, they 
were one and the same. Unity for Man in his relationship with himself, his 
world and with God, all depend upon God's sovereignty. The question of unity 
was an eschatological question. Whether Man wil l accept the authority of God 
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as it breaks into the world of his experience as something quite unique and 
different. This is the Biblical question, and the Bible correctly understood 
pushes the individual to the point "where one must decide to accept or reject the 
sovereignty of God". 2 5 
Having reached this point of understanding Barth still had to deal with 
the question which Blumhardt looked at only haltingly, that is, the nature of this 
God whose sovereignty Man is called upon to acknowledge. Barth was well 
aware of this problem and began to address it in the early theological essays. He 
put the question in his own inimitable way. I f the content of the Bible is God, 
then what "is the content of the contents?".26 
Even at this early stage Barth was struggling to find an answer to this 
question. Clearly he perceived the answer to be in some fundamental way a 
Christological answer,27 though at the time his ideas are somewhat vague. To 
express this truth Barth used the concept of the "Word of God", 2 8 which meant 
the standpoint of God, the thoughts of God, the will of God as he addressed 
Man. 2 9 But having decided to approach the question of unity from this 
direction, he was still faced with the burning question as to the nature of the 
God who addresses Man. With respect to the Bible, Barth still had to discover 
the "content of the contents". Without an answer to this question there could be 
no absolute sovereignty, and therefore no unity of direction and purpose. 
To a large extent he articulated what he saw to be the 'end', but not the 
'means'. In powerfully eschatological language he described the "power of life 
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and resurrection",30 that eternity should "dawn in place of time" 3 1 and that the 
"events of the Bible are the beginning, the glorious beginning of a new 
world" . 3 2 At times, during these early essays, it was almost as i f Barth was 
quoting from Blumhardt verbatim. 3 3 Moving away from the ideas of 
Schleiermacher and individual enlightenment, he began to explore the Biblical 
view of a "new world" 3 4 and a new creation. 
Harnack's Historical Criticism. 
It was not surprising that Barth's line of thinking should eventually bring 
him into conflict with Adolf von Harnack, because the latter had championed 
the role of historical criticism as the only true defence of the Christian faith 
against scientific scepticism. Not unlike Schleiermacher before him, Harnack 
tried in his own fashion to defend Christianity against a growing antagonism 
which had developed during the Nineteenth Century. 
Schleiermacher's method had been to present Christianity as both the 
basis and zenith of cultural achievement. Both he and Harnack shared the 
common aim of unifying spiritual and material aspects of reality. In this way 
Harnack sought to establish theology as a discipline of autonomous integrity 
amongst other scientific disciplines. 
Schleiermacher's method essentially eradicated much of the historical 
content of the Gospel. Instead the individual was seen to be a contemporary of 
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the person of Christ within the realm of his own inner religious experience.35 
This outlook was particularly weak in respect of its Christology. 
Harnack's concern about this approach was that it left the field open to 
the creation of various 'phantoms', imaginary figures growing out of the 
individual's inner attitude and imagination.36 While Schleiermacher sought to 
remove the object of enquiry from the realm of scientific investigation, Harnack 
tried to establish it firmly within that realm, "at one with the task of science in 
general".37 This meant embracing the parameters of enquiry appropriate to his 
age and acceptable to his peers. This led to his development of an historical-
critical method as the foundation of theological enquiry. 
In 1895 Harnack delivered a paper entitled "Christianity and History". 3 8 
In this address he sought to answer the criticisms of his contemporaries who 
thought Christianity to be simply an anachronism. Therefore, he began his 
counter argument with a statement of what he perceived to be the central issue 
in the debate. Speaking of the Church he said, 
The whole meaning and purport of religion - life in God, 
the forgiveness of sins, consolation in suffering - she 
couples with Christ's person; and in so doing she 
associates everything that gives life its significance and its 
permanent value, nay the Eternal itself, with an historical 
fact; maintaining the indissoluble unity of both. 3 9 
What this shows is that Barth and Harnack were trying in their different 
ways to address the same problem, the relationship of time with eternity. Barth 
had learned from Blumhardt that the two are not compatible, save as the direct 
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result of the intervention of God as a unique and sovereign act. Harnack, on the 
other hand, perceived in the 'mechanism' of history, the way in which it 
'works', the possibility of time and eternity being drawn together in a more 
constant and unified fashion. 
His argument began with an acknowledgement that "all history seems to 
be a ceaseless process of growth and decay".40 But, this did not mean that 
reason had superseded history as the primary component in religion. Such a 
proposition would be based upon the false assumption that everything that has 
happened in history is of trivial importance and accidental occurence.41 
Likewise, Harnack rejected the assumption that Christianity had been made 
redundant by the overriding growth of a "natural religion". 4 2 Instead, he 
presented two conceptions "development and personality'143 as the determinate 
factors in the growth of the Christian faith. Therefore, he could say that, 
religion is no ready-made structure, but a growth; and it is 
a growth that falls within the history of humanity. Its 
developments are no mere outward semblance: they are a 
reality. 4 4 
When Harnack said this he was not expounding a purely developmental 
understanding of history. Indeed this was the very argument he was trying to 
refute. His counter argument followed this line of reasoning; "only in the sphere 
of political economy"45 can any sort of simple developmental process be traced; 
in the area of "intellectual and moral ideas"46 developments and changes cannot 
be accounted for except by reference to "the strength and the activity of an 
individual, of a personality" . 4 7 It is not simply the power of ideas which govern 
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the movement of history. Rather it is the strength of an idea "merged"48 with a 
personality that "begets a living conviction". 4 9 It is the "person"50 who has 
always provided the momentum of history. It is force of personality which is 
communicated through the historical medium, and this force "we can only 
feel". 3 1 Therefore, speaking of Christ Harnack said 
no aspiration and no progress have ever existed without 
the miraculous exertion of an individual wi l l , of a person. 
It was not what the person said that was new and 
strange....but how he said it; how it became in him the 
strength and power of a new life; how he transmitted it to 
his disciples.52 
In this ability to communicate force of personality Christ was not alone. 
In this sense he stood in a long line of prophets of various sorts in whom the 
"Spirit of God"" had "borne sway". 5 4 What made him unique was that the first 
disciples received "from the abundance of this one man, grace from grace".55 It 
was this fact which Harnack perceives to be "unique in history". 5 6 
In the series of arguments in which he was engaged, Harnack chose to 
define religion as "a relation of the soul to God, and nothing more". 5 7 He 
rejected the possibility that dogmatic statements of Christian orthodoxy can in 
themselves further the relation of the individual soul to God because "it is one 
thing to be sensible of their truth, it is another to be possessed of their 
power". 5 8 
Harnack saw the gospel as something both very simple, and very 
profound. Christianity in its correct form related not to dogma or ecclesiastical 
56 
The Debate with Harnack 
authority but to the gospel of Jesus Christ. 5 9 The Gospel was best defined by 
looking to the 'disposition' which its hearing created in the heart of the 
individual. 6 0 
The religion of the gospel rests upon....faith in Jesus 
Christ ie. because of him, this particular historical person, 
the believer is certain that God rules heaven and earth and 
that God the Judge is also the Father and Redeemer.61 
The ability to understand the truth of the Christian faith was dependent 
solely upon the "voice of God", 6 2 the perception on the part of the individual 
that God had spoken to him. But this communication rarely occurred "without 
human help and intervention",6 3 so that 
one Christian educates another; heart kindles heart; and 
the strength to wil l what we approve comes from the 
mysterious Power by which one life awakens another.64 
In this line of communication Christ stood at the beginning, as the 
'spring' from which the "river of l i f e " 6 5 first flowed. This same river also 
flowed in the hearts of his disciples, assuring them that "Jesus lives, and with 
him I live also".66 It is the image of his l i f e 6 7 which gave "surety for the reality 
of a future world", 6 8 and this truth was "revealed to our inmost feelings".6 9 
Harnack's great defence of Christianity in the light of historical criticism 
was that the latter had in no sense been able to lessen the "power or validity" 7 0 
of what Christ said, or what he was; 
the great and simple truths which he came to preach, the 
personal sacrifices which he made, and his victory in 
death, were what formed the new life of his 
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community...This is a simple matter of fact, which no 
historical criticism can in any way alter.7 1 
It was a spiritual, not mechanistic, line of cause and effect which joined us to 
Christ, 7 2 and therefore guaranteed the validity of the Christian faith. 
I f this is indeed the case then certain things must follow. Since 
Christianity becomes dependent for its efficacy upon the clearly perceived 
historical figure of Jesus, then the role of theology is to make this figure visible. 
This is achieved by a process of stripping history of its superfluous and merely 
metaphysical speculation.73 This process brings into question statements which 
have as their foundation anything other than an historical viewpoint. Speculative 
thought is immediately disciplined by the need for historical accuracy. 
Metaphysics based upon purely rational concepts ceases to have any meaning. 
Therefore, thought becomes scientific in so far as it is disciplined in its search 
for the historical and its rejection of all else. 
In his own particular way Harnack was struggling with the same basic 
theological question which Schleiermacher sought to solve by using his form of 
ontological under-pinning, again the problem of unity. He differed from his 
predecessor in that he saw the thread of continuity running between Christ and 
the present as a traceable 'reality' within the movements and changes of history. 
Schleiermacher's point of reference had been borrowed from his cultural 
setting. Harnack on the other hand used the idea of a spiritual continuum to sift 
and judge the validity of historical material; 
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The measure and the directive for all higher motives in 
the life of men is the conviction that we are not mere 
fragments of nature, but bear within ourselves an eternal 
life as the citizens and creators of a spiritual kingdom. 7 4 
Harnack was opposed to Schleiermacher's conception of Jesus as a paradigm of 
perfect 'God Consciousness',and insisted that he was an historical figure within 
a particular historical setting. 
Harnack was treading a path between various theological problems. 
There was the possibility that Christianity was based upon the gospel and person 
of Jesus Christ as a strictly non-historic phenomenon; it could not be expressed 
in a set of binding, historically conditioned, rational propositions. But then 
neither could it escape the 'historical' even when part of its content related to 
the inner disposition of the hearer. This would lead into the speculative realm of 
metaphysics. Harnack clearly thought that the Christian faith was 'alive' and 
independent of any age, but given to us in an historical form. In this sense 
history was the necessary medium of divine revelation. Rumscheidt makes the 
point that, 
Harnack did not regard culture and morality as non-
divine. Doubtless culture is not religion, nor is morality 
identical with religion. But a culture and morality deeply 
indebted to and influenced by religion are - i f not divine -
then certainly transparent to the divine. 7 5 
God's presence in history could never be equated directly with the historical. 
But then the presence of God was always and only perceived in history. In this 
sense history might be thought of as God's ontological medium. 
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Harnack could say of the gospel that it circled around a single central 
point; 
Eternal life in the midst of time through God's power and 
his presence. It is not an ethical or social arcanum for the 
purpose of preserving all sorts of things or of improving 
them. Even the mere question of what it has contributed, 
to the cultural progress of mankind does harm to its 
spirit. 7 6 
For this reason he would not allow any simplistic association of the presence of 
God in history with the development of cultural and moral standards. The 
Gospel was addressed to man in history, out of and as part of that same history. 
It caused a change in man's inner disposition which always remained an 
historical occurrence. Thus, Christianity could never be equated with a simple 
moral or cultural change of attitude. This meant that the gospel was historically 
expressed, but never historically bound. Spirituality was a "disposition of mind 
marked by worship in spirit and in truth", 7 7 and was both part of history, and 
free from history. 
Harnack argued that this historical grounding of Christianity had been 
lost early in the life of the church. The reason for its decline he saw as resting 
with those who had enclosed a living and simple faith within the corpse-like 
expressions of dogmatic theology.78 The intrusion of the metaphysical and 
speculative into the realm of theology had dulled the edge of the Gospel. 
Together dogma and metaphysics had removed Jesus from the concrete world of 
human experience. Harnack sought to re-discover what had been lost by a new 
emphasis upon the need for a process of historical contextualisation. 
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To this end he insisted that the basic error had originated in the need to 
translate the Gospel into the thought forms of the Hellenistic culture in which 
the Gospel was first preached.79 As time progressed these dogmatic 
formulations came to be maintained simply by reference to their doctrinal 
orthodoxy. Therefore, to safeguard their authoritative status they became 
embodied in various liturgical and ecclesiastical forms; 
The Gospel did not enter the world as a statutory religion 
and it can therefore have no classical and permanent 
manifestation.80 
In practical terms this meant that the gospel could be set free from those 
early forms of unhealthy authoritative dogmatism, ecclesiastical, liturgical and 
metaphysical, which in turn gave rise to an 
authoritarianism and an intellectual servitude which are 
irreconcilable with the Gospel and its spirit. 8 1 
It was towards this end that Harnack developed his historical-critical 
method. Behind this lay the conception that truth was revealed gradually, by 
degree. By studying the changing historical forms in which truth was held, 
especially the institutional manifestations, the theologian was able to see through 
these to the basis of that truth. It was the process of distilling the truth of the 
non-historical gospel from the historical medium of past centuries. Having done 
this it was then free to be translated into the historical medium of any particular 
age. 
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Harnack did not try to produce a definitive expression of the Christian 
faith. This was impossible, since by his own definition, the efficacy of 
Christianity was the product of two things: the proclamation of the Gospel 
expressed in a particular historical medium; and the resultant inner 'disposition' 
of Man. Therefore, what he was trying to do was develop a historical method 
which could be the basis of discovering and expressing the gospel for future 
generations; 
Neither exegesis nor dogmatics will break the power of 
traditions which are now burdening the conscience of 
man....dogma must be purified by history. 8 2 
What this meant was that the role of the theologian in Christian theology 
was superseded by that of the historian. The latter, by use of his historical 
method, was able to judge 8 3 the content of history and intervene in its course so 
as to pass on to future generations the correct content of a past age. This content 
was correct only in so far as it remained a living content; 
Only that history which is not yet past but which is and 
remains a living part of our present deserves to be known 
by a l l . 8 4 
In these terms Harnack's Christology described Jesus as the 'concretion' of the 
gospel; 
He was the personal concretion and power of the gospel 
and we still perceive him as such. For none has ever 
known the Father in the way he knew him, and he gives 
this knowledge to others...He leads them to God, not only 
by his word but still more by what he is and does and, 
finally, by his suffering. 8 5 
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This was the natural outworking of Harnack's approach to theology 
based upon the reality of history as the sole medium of God's revelation. In the 
very nature of Christ there was the unique fusion of eternity and history, so that 
in him, in his transparency, the nature and wil l of the Father became manifest. 
This was not the same as the 'God consciousness' of Schleiermacher, because 
here there was no attempt to transcend or dissipate the historical. The medium 
of history was taken as the norm, and the Gospel ran through, and in it. For 
Harnack, i f there was no history, then there was no Gospel. 
This meant that Harnack saw the love of one man for another as a pure 
reflection of the love of God for his creation. Here love had its root in an 
internal attitude. Jesus re-defined ethics in a unique way. This 'Higher 
Righteousness'86 had its basis in Man's newly awakened awareness of his 
spiritual unity with the Father.87 Therefore, religion was actually the soul of 
morality. A society could not hope to build a code of moral practice without 
first rediscovering its basis within the realm of the love of the Father. It was this 
love of God for Man, and then man for man, which provided the driving force 
behind the unifying and healing of Man's broken state. A l l this illustrates the 
fact that Harnack sought to overcome the problem of the relationship between 
Christianity and history by suggesting the existence of a spiritual continuum, 
rooted in the personality of the historical Jesus. 
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Barth's Response to Harnack. 
In his lecture delivered in 1920, Barth sought to address the same 
problem. It was a problem he could not escape once he had accepted the 
powerfully eschatological character of Blumhardt's theology. I f there existed 
two radically different forms of ontological reality, the world of God and the 
world of Man, then in what sense could history be the medium in which they 
met? 
Barth examined the method advocated by Harnack, but could find in it 
no valid, overriding principle. The reason was quite simple. In his own reading 
of the Bible he had come to recognise a phenomena for which he could find no 
purely human, historical or rational explanation. 
To me personally it came first with Paul: this man 
evidently sees and hears something which is above 
everything, which is absolutely beyond the range of my 
observation and the measure of my thought.8 8 
Barth was willing to acknowledge the historical impact of whatever it 
was that dominated the mind and vision of Saint Paul. While being "above 
everything", this cause or reason left a definite imprint on the lives of those who 
were touched by it. Quite clearly a "stone of unusual weight must have been 
dropped into the deep water there somewhere".89 But then what exactly was the 
content of that impact? Unlike Harnack, Barth was unwilling to let his inquiry 
come to rest at the function of personality. He pushed beyond it towards the 
'agent' which caused such an indelible impression. Once more Barth was 
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looking for the "content of the contents". In this respect his criticism of 
Harnack's work was not because he opposes the critical-historical methods 
which the latter advocated. Rather, "The historical-critical school must become 
more critical in order to suit me!" 9 0 Barth's view was that the methods 
advocated by Harnack and his contemporaries did not penetrate deeply enough 
into the substance or content of the theological question. They merely prepared 
the ground. 
In the Bible the eschatological dimension to reality was presented to the 
reader clothed in the language and imagery of a past age. The role of critical-
historical methods were to strip these away, so leaving the "content" of Biblical 
revelation accessible. Historical criticism might be able to assess 'what' 
happened, but it proved woefully inadequate in grasping the 'why' of the Bible; 
the cause behind the most peculiar Biblical history. 
The reason for this was simple. Barth expressed it in this way; 
The Bible itself, in any case, answers our eager Why 
neither like a sphinx, with There was a reason! nor, like a 
lawyer, with a thousand arguments, deductions, and 
parallels, but says to us, The decisive cause is God. 
Because God lives, speaks and acts, there was a 
reason...!91 
In other words, the reason which lay behind this strange and wonderful history 
rested within the purposes, and therefore the nature, of God himself. God was 
the "content of the contents". For this reason the historical-critical school could 
have only limited use, because no amount of this sort of assessment could lay 
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bare the nature of God. 9 2 This was a direct expression of Blumhardt's 
understanding of two distinct ontological worlds. It was a consequence of Man 
being 'outside' the theological question. 
Biblical history in the Old and New Testaments is not 
really history at all, but seen from above is a series of free 
divine acts and seen from below a series of fruitless 
attempts to undertake something in itself impossible. 
From the viewpoint of ordered development in particular 
and in general it is quite incomprehensible - as every 
religious teacher who is worth his salt knows only too 
wel l . 9 3 
Barth contended that the basis of Biblical revelation, and therefore 
Christian revelation, was the freedom of God. As an ontologically distinct 
being, Man could have no call on God. The former stood in need of the latter, 
dependent upon his self-giving as the only means of gaining insight and 
knowledge into nature of reality. Such 'knowledge' once given was never 
'knowledge' as such. Because what was revealed was an ontological reality 
itself, it could not be translated into the human framework of rationality. 
This was the problem of eschatology. To Barth's mind Harnack had a 
completely "uneschatological view of history". 9 4 In later years he was to explain 
this in terms of a "horror of all corporeality" expressed in an attack upon the 
"realistic emphasis" of the New Testament.95 For Harnack, eschatology was a 
function of metaphysics. To Barth it was the necessary expression of ontological 
distinction. 
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Barth saw theology in the nineteenth century as becoming "essentially a 
presentation and philosophy of religion in general, and of the Christian religion 
in particular".9 6 This in turn led to a confusion of 'grace' as the free, 
spontaneously given, gift of God, with the "prolongation of an already existing 
religious experience".97 
In his discovery of the "Godness of God", Barth was confronted with the 
'subjectivity' of God. Through the witness of Scripture and the teaching of 
Blumhardt he realised that, although any scientific approach to theology must 
centre its investigations upon God as the 'object', because this 'object' was also 
'subject1, no ordinary scientific approach could be used. It was the nature of the 
'object' of theology which was at issue. 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the 'object' of scientific 
theology has proven difficult to isolate. I f this were not the case the dichotomy 
which exists between the thinking of Schleiermacher and Harnack would not 
have arisen. The former insisted that the theological 'object' could not be 
approached except on the sub-rational plane of the religious experience. In 
response to this idea he provided a philosophy of the subconscious. The latter 
complained that this would only lead to solipsistic, metaphysical, speculation. 
His approach was completely rational and aimed to isolate the 'object' from 
subjective and historical debris. Which way lies the truth? 
Barth rejected Schleiermacher's method because it resulted in Man 
talking about himself. He rejected Harnack because he could not accept the 
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subordination of God's sovereign will to a rational process of historical 
criticism. 
Schleiermacher and Harnack introduced into the problem a 'third 
principle', a governing dynamic, woven into the fabric of spiritual and temporal 
reality. This then allowed for a bridging of the gap between the inside and 
outside of the theological dilemma. In Schleiermacher it was a form of 
ontological underpinning; in Harnack the idea of a spiritual continuum. 
Barth rejected both of these approaches for the same reason. The bridges 
they used were artificial constructions which sat lightly to the witness of Holy 
Scripture. They were reflections of human ingenuity, rather than an expression 
of God's freedom and sovereignty. But to reject these alternatives did not deal 
with the problem. Pelikan, the church historian, expresses it in these terms; 
without sound historical study Christian theology 
inevitably falls victim to the ... changing fads of the most 
recent theological masters and dogmatic system builders, 
or to the murky subjectivities of a religious solipsism.98 
The point Pelikan is making, he makes from an historian's point of 
view. But it can legitimately be broadened to cover the whole area of 
theological enquiry. It concerns the problem of verification, discovering a point 
of reference whereby statements concerning God can be assessed and judged. 
The question of verification is doubly important in a science where the object of 
enquiry is not immediately accessible. The introduction of a 'third principle' is 
an attempt to deal with this problem. 
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The critic of Barth's position might quite rightly point out that a mere 
insistence upon the sovereignty of God is surely not enough to safeguard against 
vain metaphysical speculation. This is doubly the case in a theology built around 
eschatology as an expression of ontological distinction. Without some 
safeguard, or guiding principle, what is to prevent theology descending towards 
mere "barbarism".99 I f a point of verification does not exist in the religious 
subconscious, or in a rational model of historical criticism, where might it be 
found? 
The avenue which Barth chose to explore had its roots in the notion of 
the sovereignty of God. His discovery of God as the 'object' who is 'subject' 
led him to the possibility that this 'subject' might present itself as a self-
verifying 'object'. In other words, true objectivity might only be inherent in the 
'object' itself, so providing a new basis for 'scientific theology'. I f this was 
indeed the case then any scientific method which imposed itself upon its object 
would be inappropriate. In this vein Torrance can say of Harnack's method that, 
while scientific activity is concerned with the pure 
knowledge of its object, for that very reason the nature of 
the object must be allowed to prescribe the specific mode 
of rational activity to be adopted.1 0 0 
The logic of this approach was eschatological. It defied any attempt to 
read from the face of history the truth of God's revelation. Therefore, 
The so-called 'historical Jesus' constructed out of the 
records is not identical with revelation, for revelation is 
the act of God himself which cannot be read directly off 
the face of human history. 1 0 1 
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This illustrates the point that, even at this early stage, Barth was motivated in 
his thinking by the idea that "the content of revelation is God". 1 0 2 That is, that 
there existed a direct relation between ontology and revelation. 
The great weakness with this understanding was that it lacked a foothold 
in rationality. Barth's criticism of Schleiermacher had been based upon this very 
point. Therefore, what he needed to show was that there existed a direct, three 
way, relationship between ontology, revelation and rationality, that is, between 
God in his subjectivity, his giving of that subjective nature as an object and the 
rationality of Man in his grasp of that given object. Barth needed to discover an 
ontological-rationality, the means of expressing in rational form ontological 
existence. This meant discovering the necessary relationship between God and 
human thought, based upon God's giving of himself as an object, so that the 
danger of theology becoming purely metaphysical speculation might be 
overcome. 
To deal with this problem Barth chose to explore a third possibility. That 
is, that the revelation of God in Christ carried with it its own rationality, and it 
is this inherent rationality in the object of revelation which itself provides the 
bridge between the two sides of the theological problem. Barth found this 
possibility in the theology of Blumhardt, but the latter "naively" assumed its 
existence without ever exploring its repercussions.103 It is the tension between 
these two understandings of the rational nature of Christian theology which 
dominated the exchange of correspondence between Barth and Harnack in 1923. 
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Much of Barth's theological position at this time is contained in his essay 
"Biblical Questions, Insights, and Vistas". 1 0 4 It begins with Barth defining his 
terms of reference as regards the nature of the theological problem. Simply 
stated, Barth saw that the problem for those who would interpret the Bible was 
that they were caught "midway between Yes and No, No and Yes". 1 0 S 
On the one hand, Barth saw Man as being 'inside' the question 
concerning the nature of God. This one question provided the basic 
presupposition to all Man's searches after meaning.1 0 6 A l l questions of ultimacy 
began with the basic question as regards the nature of God. 
On the other hand, Barth also saw Man as 'outside' the question, by 
virtue of the fact that he had to ask the question regarding the nature of God at 
all; "The question wil l no longer down but breaks out in f lame.. ." 1 0 7 
Barth asked the question, how is it that Man can neither grasp with ful l 
assurance the existence of a God who cares, nor deny his existence in the face 
of so much evidence to the contrary in the world of his experience? How is it 
that Man is always caught within the midst of the question regarding the nature 
of God, midway between the 'yes' and the 'no'? 
On the one hand, Barth came to see the 'no' of Man's experience as a 
function of the whole problem of ontological unity. The 'no' sounding in the 
nature of Man was the product of His distinct ontological state. It was the 
affirmation of God's unique existence, the denial of an inherent law of 
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correlation between two distinct worlds. It was the affirmation, in Man, of 
God's freedom, and the sounding of Man's need. 
On the other hand, the 'yes' which sounded in Man was the aspect of his 
existence which characterised his ontological state. "Whoever understands him 
at this point, understands him completely".1 0 8 This was true of Man, not 
because of something within himself, but because of something quite beyond his 
experience. 
Now how does it happen that there is no resolving of this 
contradiction? The No from the earliest days has had on 
its side much greater power to contradict than the Yes has 
had: what is the reason it cannot once for all submerge the 
Yes? Why is it that we never break through to the clear 
and final conclusion that our sense of being inside is 
mistaken? The answer is hinted at in the very inevitability 
of our continued asking for a knowledge of God: we 
belong to the Yes and not to the N o . 1 0 9 
This assertion by Barth could not be justified, with any degree of surety, 
on the basis of Man's mixed bag of worldly experience. Its justification could 
only be found outside His ontological state. Its basis lay solely within the realm 
of God's sovereign wi l l . As such, Barth saw it as a Biblical statement born out 
of the revelation of Scripture. It was an assertion whose meaning could be 
validated solely on the grounds of God's sovereignty, and Man's obedience. In 
this respect Barth saw the obedience of Christ as the key to understanding his 
life and mission. 
We have received from Jesus many different truths. But 
the simplest of them all we have the least comprehended -
that he was the Son of God and that we, i f we wi l l , may 
go with him the way wherein one simply believes that the 
Father's will is truth and must be done....We may take 
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the new way. Or we may not. Sooner or later we shall. 
There is no other. 1 1 0 
Put simply, Barth saw the will of God as bridging the gap between the 
two ontologically distinct worlds. Man might have a part in this, but He could 
never be in control of it. Two worlds would always remain two worlds. They 
could come together only as the direct result of God's action. Therefore, the 
rationality which governed and explained this occurrence was the will of God, 
the rationality of God. As such it was accessible to Man only as a direct result 
of God's mercy. Therefore, theology became a discipline with its own distinct 
character and purpose. It was this understanding on Barth's part of the nature of 
theology which formed the background to the exchange of correspondence in 
1923. 
In the initial exchange of letters Harnack levelled certain specific 
criticisms at the 'despisers of scientific theology', 1 1 1 among whom he numbered 
Barth. The content of these criticisms reflected the emphasis already seen in 
Harnack's theology upon the need for a sound historical basis to all thought 
regarding the nature of Biblical interpretation. 
His basic problem, which he articulated in different ways in the first 
eight of his "questions",112 related to Barth's insistence upon the ontologically 
distinct natures of God and the world. There was in his writings a sense of 
exasperation. How was it that anyone could claim that the Bible was a 
"unity" 1 1 3 such that its content could be determined without reference to 
"historical knowledge and critical reflection"?1 1 4 At the same time, i f the Bible 
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simply reflected the truth that "God and the world... are complete opposites"115 
how was the truth of morality, and the "development of culture" 1 1 6 and "one's 
own existence be protected against atheism"?117 
In contrast, Harnack argued that i f the "awakening of fa i th" 1 1 8 was the 
same as an experience of God 1 1 9 then how could such an experience be 
separated from the medium of history? This being the case, critical reflection 
must always be necessary to distinguish genuine faith from "uncontrollable 
fanaticism". 1 2 0 
Likewise, how is it, asked Harnack, that God's world and man's world 
are different? I f this was indeed the case the result would be the withdrawal of 
the individual from the wor ld 1 2 1 and a failure to correctly equate the love of 
one's neighbour with the love for God, 1 2 2 the core of the Gospel. This would 
mean in turn that there could not be the necessary "education in godliness",123 
since no worldly perspective could provide a doorway into God's morality. 
Critical reflection was needed to draw out from history the divine content and 
justification for morality. 1 2 4 
I f God had simply cut Man loose to drift free upon a sea of history, how 
was He to prevent Himself from being beaten down by the waves and storms of 
immorality and atheism?125 Wasn't it far better to see the cultural and ethical 
deposits of society as landfalls of Christian hope and belief? And since this was 
the case, should not the tools of critical reflection be used as tools of 
navigation?126 
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Also, the Christian life should not be one of doubt and questioning. The 
Christian should not be caught "between door and hinge". 1 2 7 He should feel 
secure in his knowledge of God, since such knowledge lay waiting to be 
discovered in the "true and beautiful". 1 2 8 Critical reflection was the doorway 
into this aspect of truth. 
I f sin was lack of "reverence and love", 1 2 9 then how was it to be 
overcome save by the preaching of God's "holy majesty and love"? 1 3 0 The key 
to salvation was a clear vision of human value in the unity of the soul with God. 
Such witness was only possible because of the tools of critical reflection. 1 3 1 
Finally, in a world in which so many sub-conscious experiences were 
wrongly thought to be equivalent to experiences of God, what else could 
safeguard the "real" 1 3 2 content of the Gospel other than the rational and critical? 
Did these two not rightly stand guard over what was so valuable and precious? 
And i f they should be lost would not "gnostic occultism" 1 3 3 simply come to the 
fore? Since Christianity must be Christocentric, then the "real" Jesus,134 the 
human figure of history, the doorway into the heart of God, had to be made 
accessible through the use of the critical-historical method. 1 3 5 
Barth's reply to his former teacher circled around the central theme of 
the nature of history. It has already been seen how Barth was influenced by the 
" I f Christianity, then not history" of Overbeck, and the simple and yet profound 
proclamation of Blumhardt "He is risen!". The divergence in the thought of 
Barth from that of his theological teacher can quite rightly be traced back to 
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these two corresponding points of reference, because they both highlight the 
impossibility, and yet for Blumhardt also the actuality, of the power of God as a 
'historical' happening. 
Barth's counter argument to Harnack was the same he voiced against the 
critics of his commentary on 'Romans'. He, Barth, was not a "despiser" of 
scientific theology. It was simply the case that Harnack's critical method was 
not "critical enough". I f it had been, it would have expressed that 
the communication of the 'content of the gospel' can be 
accomplished... only through an act of this 'content' 
itself... The 'scientific character' of theology would then 
be its adherence to the recollection that its object was once 
subject and must become that again and again... 1 3 6 
Since, the true 'content' of the Bible was actually the nature of God as 
he revealed himself to the world, then the only possible avenue of approach to 
understanding the Bible was that of "faith".131 As such, historical criticism 
might prepare the ground for the proclamation of the Gospel, but it could never 
create the desire for that proclamation because the latter was only accessible 
through "the Word of Christ" 1 3 8 within the realm of faith. 
In Barth's insistence upon the efficacy of faith it is possible to see once 
again the influences of Overbeck and Blumhardt. This perception arose out of 
an understanding of the ontological difference between God and his world. Faith 
was a necessary product of Man' s ontological state. 
A theology, should it lose the understanding of the basic 
distance which faith posits between itself and this world, 
would in the same measure have to lose sight of the 
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knowledge of God the Creator. For the 'utter contrast' of 
God and the world, the cross, is the only way in which we 
as human beings can consider the original and final unity 
of Creator and creature.1 3 9 
This statement provides as precise an articulation of Barth's early 
theological position as can be found anywhere. In it he expressed the idea that 
God's purpose, his rationality, became evident in the cross of Jesus Christ. As 
such, this rationality served to highlight rather than blur the distinction between 
creature and Creator. Therefore, theology as a discipline concerned with the 
rationality of God was a discipline of faith. In this respect all the answers which 
Barth gave to the criticisms of Harnack reflect this basic understanding.140 
The two men never came to a point of mutual acceptance other than on a 
personal level. Barth's thought always remained for Harnack, "under the cover 
of a heavy fog" . 1 4 1 Historically the debate marked the separation of theology as 
a discipline along divided paths. The road which Barth chose to explore some 
have subsequently embraced and others rejected. 
As regards the theme of this thesis, the correspondence of 1923 is 
important because it articulates Barth's determination to find the rationality of 
revelation in the cross and resurrection of Jesus. Such rationality he understood, 
even then, to find its content within the Content of God's giving of himself. 
Therefore, any understanding of objective reality, be that the nature of Man, or 
the nature of evil, was related to the rationality of God as it entered the world as 
something unique and independent. Any understanding of true objectivity could 
not be found from 'within'. Objectivity was concerned always and only with the 
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sovereign will and purpose of God. Therefore, it was God's attitude towards 
different aspects of the created order which would define their standing as 
examples, or otherwise, of objective truth. 
Perhaps this clear articulation of Barth's theological position, while 
outlining his thinking during this period, gives a slightly false impression. At 
this stage his theology had not found such an ordered expression. This lay some 
years ahead. Its achievement followed on from what has been called Barth's 
'dialectic' theology. 
78 
DIALECTIC THEOLOGY 
It has been shown that to understand the early theology of Karl Barth the 
reader must have in mind the same basic question with which Barth himself 
struggled in the early years of the twentieth century. That is the question of 
theological and ontological unity. This had become for Barth a question which 
would "no longer down". 
It has also been shown how he came to reject the methods of his teachers 
and contemporaries because of their use of a 'third principle', a form of human 
rationality through which to interpret the revelation of God. Barth saw this as 
creating a false unity between God and the world which denied God's unique 
status and existence. 
This inner character of all theology had become clear to Barth in his 
work as Pastor of Safenwil in the years surrounding the 1914-18 war, both by 
the nature of the work itself, and by his growing awareness of the sovereignty 
of God declared to mankind in the resurrection of Jesus. 
Barth knew himself to be 'inside' and not 'outside' the theological 
question. He had learned from Blumhardt that any understanding of Man's unity 
with God could only be found in the nature and wil l of God. Theology as a 
discipline had to reflect that fact. 
79 
Dialectic Theology 
As a result, Barth understood that questions of ultimacy, of unity and of 
eschatology were all expressions of the problem of ontology. The clear 
difference which exists between the world of God and the world of Man came 
to light in the resurrection of Jesus. At this point all theological questions found 
their most articulate expression. 
Barth was to say in later years that it was the "new recognition of the 
divinity of God which so deeply stirred us and then also others".1 God's 
freedom as a Being over and against humanity. His unique and original 
ontological state. In short, his 'subjectivity'. 
By this I mean that property of God which in relation to 
humanity and to the world is absolutely his own. 2 
It would be a mistake to think that Barth's realisation of the subjectivity 
of God was simply axiomatic, that he was trying to redress the imbalance of 
nineteenth century theology by stressing the autonomy of God over and against 
the thinking of the theologian, that he was using a principle or an idea. 
The truth of this is shown by the way in which his awareness of God's 
subjectivity developed. He was a Pastor within the Reformed Church of 
Switzerland. Therefore, it was to a large part the nature of his work that made 
him re-assess his own theology. It was in the face of practical pastoral need and 
the discipline of weakly sermon preparation that his theology developed. 
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I f he had simply chosen to state the idea of God's subjectivity as a 
theological axiom then he would have condemned himself to the same path as 
Schleiermacher and Harnack. It would have meant losing sight of the fact that 
ontology and rationality cannot be separated. 
This is, perhaps, too clear an expression of Barth's thinking at the time. 
But certainly it is true that he had learnt from Blumhardt that the rationality of a 
God who raises the dead cannot simply be equated with the rationality of Man. 
In Blumhardt this was expressed in terms of God's sovereignty. Barth took the 
point and began to explore what it might mean in terms of rationality. 
It is clear from the biographical material that Barth's greatest challenge 
as a Pastor was provided by the weakly need to preach.3 In an early essay4 he 
articulated the emphasis which this particular discipline came to exercise upon 
his theology. As such, it provided not the basis of a new "school"5 but a 
marginal note to all theology. As Barth chose to call it, "a pinch of spice in the 
food". 6 As a Pastor and Preacher, he felt that he had something to say 
concerning the relationship between God and the world that was unique to his 
situation. In no sense was he trying to create a new rational model to replace 
those of Schleiermacher and Harnack. His "pinch of spice" was meant as an 
alternative to such an approach. 
He sensed that in the minister's specific "problem",7 the sermon, the 
questionable nature of all theology became apparent, and then with a peculiar 
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force and gravity. He chose to use this word for a reason. His own specific 
situation as a Pastor was this, 
As a minister I wanted to speak to the people in the 
infinite contradiction of their life, but to speak the no less 
infinite message of the Bible, which was as much of a 
riddle as life...But this critical situation became to me an 
explanation of the character of all theology.8 
Here is a clear articulation of the 'problem', as Barth saw it, of being 
both 'inside' and 'outside' the theological question. In contrast to his teachers he 
did not search for another unifying principle, "Exactly not that".9 Instead he 
embraced the problem because he saw in it the most suitable expression of 
Man's condition. In this sense theology became the expression of the Pastor's 
"embarrassment".10 
In not trying to evade the experience he found the beginning of a new 
theological method. Previously the theologian had been the questioner, the 
master of his craft, the 'virtuoso1. Barth discovered that the roles had been 
reversed. The questioner had become the questioned. 
The Minister, as one who must speak the word of God to his 
parishioners, was indeed surrounded by questions. Previously both 
Schleiermacher and Harnack had sought answers within the world of human 
experience. Barth saw the cultural and social confidence of the nineteenth 
century to be shallow and inadequate. It had been blown apart, for him, by the 
immorality and hypocrisy of the war. 
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In a scathing attack upon the cultural theology of the post war years he 
drew upon a Biblical image to make his point. 1 1 He likened it to the building of 
a 'Tower of Babel', the reaching out of Man towards something better. 
A fruitless idolatry, Man simply create an earth-bound righteousness. 
The foundation of the tower was still the earth. It reached up, but never beyond 
to a "new world". 1 2 Barth saw morality, allegiance to state and religious fervour 
as simply building materials.13 
Are we not rather hoping by our very activity to conceal 
in the most subtle way the fact that the critical event 
which ought to happen has not yet done so and probably 
never wi l l? 1 4 
But what was the 'critical event' that Barth was looking for? It was this 
critical event, or the need of it, which came to haunt the Pastor when he stood 
in his pulpit on a Sunday morning. The Bible open before him and the up turned 
faces of his congregation below him, there was a simple "What now?". l s The 
whole situation was heavy with expectancy. 
This was a "grotesque"16 drama in which the theological problem 
became critically apparent. A drama in which the 'inside' and 'outside' of 
Man's existence sat side by side. This was an dominated by the knowledge that 
""God is present!""17, but in what sense? 
In the act of Sunday worship Barth discovered the truth of Blumhardt's 
assertion that there is 'Action in Waiting'. 1 8 In the preface to the first edition of 
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Romans he makes the point that Paul's letter wi l l "wait". 1 9 Under the influences 
of pulpit, Blumhardt and Paul, Barth discovered the eschatological nature of 
theological truth. 
This eschatological dimension to life made itself felt to the congregation 
in the simple question, "Is it true?".20 It was the search for unity which brought 
people to Church on Sunday; the same basic search that stirred the minds of 
Harnack and Schleiermacher to develop, in their different ways, such intricate 
theological systems. It was 'the' question which characterised the life of Man; is 
it true? 
In this sense the whole event of Sunday morning worship, in whatever 
church it might take place, was an eschatological event. It was a happening 
loaded with the particular sort of expectancy that reaches out towards the 
ultimate meaning of l i f e . 2 1 The Church failed when it did not recognise the 
eschatological dimension inherent in Sunday worship. 
What people were searching for was "the" word 2 2 to assure them that 
God was present in their life. To borrow a quote from Blumhardt, 
This business of eternity - honestly speaking. I have 
certain misgivings when people always comfort me with 
eternity. I f I don't see any help in the world, who can 
guarantee me help in eternity?23 
It was this clear need which Barth identified in his congregation in Safenwil, 
and which in turn drove his thinking towards dialectic theology. 
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Where Barth differed from Blumhardt is in the fact that he identified the 
question of eternity with that of ontology. The need to answer this question 
made itself felt in Man as a necessity. About this question, Man had no 
choice.2 4 His whole ontological state was a question with which he had to live 
and struggle. It was this question which he brought to Church each Sunday 
seeking an answer. 
Blood and tears, deepest despair and highest hope, a 
passionate longing to lay hold of that which, or rather of 
him who, overcomes the world because he is its Creator 
and Redeemer.25 
Barth's understanding of eschatology was not simply the rejection of 
historicism. Nor was it only the injection into theology of various metaphysical 
categories. It was the rejection of all that is provisional and limited. It was an 
attempt to lay hold of the fundamental questions of human existence. This 
precluded an escape into phantasy in favour of a deeper immersion into the 
present.26 
In an early essay entitled "The Word of God and the Task of 
Ministry", 2 7 Barth expressed Man's ontological compulsion in the fact that 
"...we ought to speak of God". 2 8 It was this need in other men 2 9 that gave rise 
to the life and existence of the Pastor. In this sense the Pastor fulfilled his task, 
not when he attempted to help the people with the every-day aspects of their 
life, but when he addressed the 
What? Why? Whence? Wither? which stands like a minus 
sign before the whole parenthesis and changes to a new 
question all the questions inside - even those which may 
already have been answered.30 
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The life which Man lives was in one sense insignificant. The Pastor's 
role was not to help the people live, "rather...to help them die",31 that is, to 
help the people discover the answer to the basic question of life, of which their 
own existence was simply one concrete expression. 
When they come to us for help they do not really want to 
learn more about living: they want to learn more about 
what is on the father edge of living - God. We cut a 
ridiculous figure as village sages - or city sages. As such 
we are socially superfluous.32 
The opening of the Scriptures and the gathering of a congregation 
brought into collision two distinct worlds. The Preacher's role was 
eschatological in that in him was focused the ultimate human questions on the 
one hand, and the need to speak God's ultimate answers on the other. He was as 
a prism, and in that lay the promise and the problem of his preaching.33 
The Preacher did not interpret the Scriptures, but was himself interpreted 
by them. This was true daring because what might be disclosed was not what 
lay behind the Bible, but what lay behind its reader.34 The Bible, correctly 
understood, dealt with only one kind of truth, and that alone: ultimate truth. As 
such it became intelligible only when the student was willing to listen to the 
question which the Bible itself posed "Are we asking after GodV5 
This did not mean that the questions which men and women brought to 
Church should be despised. These questions were a halting articulation of the 
deeper need for which they sought an answer. In fact the human expectancy 
inherent in a church service could not be taken seriously enough because, 
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it is an adumbration of the great expectancy with which 
God arrives first upon the scene.36 
Fundamental to Barth's early theology was the sense in which the 
question of God and the question of Man were opposite sides of the same coin. 
It was yet another expression of the problem of ontology. Man was finite, and it 
was this "finitude" 3 7 which drove him to search after God. 
At the same time, his finitude was apparent, as such, only because over 
and above him stood a nature "which is straight and pure". 3 8 Man was most 
definitely inside and not outside the theological problem. But the problem 
existed not because of Man but always and only because of God. 
This was a very different approach to theology than those of 
Schleiermacher and Harnack. This was the presupposition behind all of Barth's 
thinking. It was not that he began with an axiomatic view of God, building upon 
it with more or less sophisticated intellectual structures. No. The whole point is 
that he began with God, the fact of God, the Godness of God, the subjectivity 
of God. 
Man's condition became apparent to Barth only because of God. Man's 
sense of his own finitude weighed heavily upon him only because of the 
existence of a different and quite unique Nature. Man as a question was 
overshadowed and presupposed by the greater question which was, for Man, the 
nature of God. This was not for Barth merely an intellectual question. It was 
once more a question of ontology. 
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Barth understood that the subjectivity of God prevented the theologian 
from perceiving God as an object which he could master. God could not be 
thought of as an 'object' among other 'objects'. Therefore, while the truth of 
the subjectivity of God was apparent through the impact which it made upon the 
world, it was not a truth which could be isolated from the world. Neither could 
it be understood simply as part of the world. 
Barth saw the subjectivity of God as being the Theologian's greatest 
problem, that God is God, and Man is Man. This in turn undermined the 
theology which he had been taught. Schleiermacher and Harnack blurred the 
whole issue of God's subjectivity. This in turn led to a misplaced understanding 
of the nature of the Incarnation, such that all of their thinking came to circle 
around Man, "without having any exit into the open air". 3 9 Speaking of 
Schleiermacher, Barth coined the now famous phrase, "one can not speak of 
God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice". 4 0 
In a sense, Barth made Schleiermacher "stand on his head".41 His 
understanding of the incarnation differed from his predecessor because it did not 
focus on the subjectivity of Man. Instead it expressed the subjective nature of a 
God who is able to give himself as man. 
This emphasis he had learnt from Kierkegaard.42 It was an expression of 
the ontological gap that existed between God and Man. It was also a denial of 
Schleiermacher's basic premise that Man experienced God within an already 
existing ontological framework. The 'objectivity' of God, since it was an 
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expression of his 'subjectivity', could not be inherent in Man's own subjective 
nature. This type of immediacy would be an ontological contradiction; "for to 
be known directly is the characteristic mark of an ido l " . 4 3 
Barth saw the incarnation as a miraculous expression of God's, and not 
Man's, subjectivity. As such it contradicted any merely axiomatic approach to 
theology. It highlighted both the glory and difficulty of theological thinking. 
That the promises of the faithfulness of God have been 
fulfilled in Jesus the Christ is not, and never will be, a 
self-evident truth, since in Him it appears in its final 
hiddenness and its most profound secrecy.44 
Then how might the theologian speak of God? The question of unity 
would not simply go away because it was ignored. Barth could see this. 4 5 As a 
Pastor he could not simply walk away. But then how might the theologian begin 
to build a "bridge"4 6 between these two distinct worlds? 
Barth saw the whole problem clearly expressed in Sunday morning 
worship. 
Man as man cries for God. He cries not for a truth, but 
for truth; not for something good but for the good; not for 
answers but for the answer - the one that is identical with 
its own question... He does not cry for solutions but for 
salvation; not for something human, but for God, for God 
as his saviour from humanity.47 
Man's problem was himself. He was a problem because God 'is'. It was his 
own sense of being ontological limited that forced him back to the search for 
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God. Because God 'is', Man was a question which needs to be answered. Since 
Man 'is', God was the answer to the question; 
when people ask for God, they do ask for an answer 
which is identical with their question, for an infinite which 
is also finite, for One who is beyond and also here, for a 
God who is also man.4* 
Here lay the essence of Barth's problem, and his challenge to all 
theologians; his "pinch of spice". God was both the Question and the Answer. 
Since the resurrection disclosed a quite unique realm of authority, Man was 
forced to acknowledge the limited nature of his world , 4 9 either that or create a 
third unifying principle which would help him with his problem. Since the latter 
would only serve to rob the resurrection of its meaning, Man was forced to seek 
the real answer to his question. Since his question was at its root ontological, 
then he must ask after God. 5 0 
But here was Barth's greatest problem. As someone who was called upon 
to preach he knew that to speak of God was at best "daring", 5 1 and at worst 
presumption. The subjectivity of God denied Man the opportunity to speak of 
him. Certainly Man could speak of his own need, that "adumbration" of the 
great question around which his life circled, but he could not simply speak of 
God without succumbing to clever axiomatic and intellectual games. 
The solution of the riddle, the answer to the question, the 
satisfaction of our need is the absolutely new event 
whereby the impossible becomes itself possible... There is 
no way which leads to this event; there is no faculty in 
man for apprehending it; for the way and the faculty are 
themselves new, being the revelation and the faith, the 
knowing and being enjoyed by the new man. 5 2 
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Since God was both question and answer, and since his own subjectivity 
precluded him simply being grasped as another object of Man's desire, then the 
question of unity was reiterated with growing urgency. The possibility of 
veering towards a Gnostic viewpoint was a real problem. 5 3 Barth was aware of 
both these issues. 
In his essay 'The Christian's Place in Society',3 4 Barth wrestled with the 
whole question of the historicity of God's revelation. How to express a unity 
between the 'beyond' and the present. The eternal was not inherent in the world 
(as Schleiermacher claimed), nor was it to be banished from the world as an 
unacceptable aspect of metaphysics (as Harnack claimed). The world was 'shot-
through' by the eternal, but in such a way that its disclosure lay only within the 
realm of God's self-revelation. 
The world was eschatological because it stood in relation to the ultimate 
meaning of reality as a question is related to an answer. Barth knew that there 
was an answer because he himself was a question. Therefore, ultimate meaning 
ran through the course of human history as a subjective presence which could 
not be grasped, but which nonetheless made itself felt. God was both question 
and answer. 
Therefore, Barth was able insist upon the need to embrace the world as 
question, as adumbration, but not be perceived as an end in itself. 
And this is not a matter of losing oneself in the object of 
one's regard but of penetrating through the object to its 
creative origin. 5 5 
91 
Dialectic Theology 
The object of enquiry was always the 'creative origin'. Since that origin 
revealed itself in the world as parable, then the theologian had to concern 
himself with the world. The value of events was not in themselves but in their 
'heavenly analogue'.56 In this way the world provided not only parables of the 
action of God in Man's salvation, but also parables of the death of Man 
withoutGod. 5 7 Therefore, the falling apart of so much of culture and society 
was the death of things "in themselves";58 
what is being called into question today at more than one 
point and very seriously is the deadly isolation of the 
human from the divine...We must understand the mighty 
God-given restlessness of man and by it the mighty 
shaking of the foundations of the world . 5 9 
The nature of the world was always eschatological because it was related 
in the present to the eternal meaning of history. In one sense this was a natural 
theology of negation, of insufficiency.6 0 As a 'hidden' content, the meaning of 
history could only be seen, either from each end, 6 1 or by shattering it into 
pieces; 
The most radical ending of history , the negation under 
which all flesh stands, the absolute judgement, which is 
the meaning of God for the world of men and time and 
things, is also the crimson thread which runs through the 
whole course of the world in its inevitability. 6 2 
In Barth's understanding of eschatology, history was a causeway leading 
back to the creation of the world and forward to its end. "Meaning* was 
dependent not upon method, but upon viewpoint. In other words, the 
Theologian might develop any number of clever 'methods' in his attempts to 
speak about God without ever speaking from that point at which time and 
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eternity meet and overlap. The Preacher, on the other hand, was left with no 
choice in the matter because the very need to preach forced him to stand at that 
point of overlap. The point on which he stood is intelligible only in relation to 
the beginning and end of the whole. 
Jesus could speak of the world in purely realistic terms6 3 because the 
events of the present moment were fully justified and complete in themselves.64 
However, the awareness of the eschatological nature of the moment had always 
create a tension with the world. The looking forward of the Christian meant that 
he could never accept the mortal character of his existence as an end in itself. 
Therefore, the act of God's affirmation had also to be an act of questioning. The 
questions which Barth found in Safenwil were the adumbration of God's 
affirmation of the world. 6 5 
God is saving the world; he has already saved the world; and the world 
wil l be saved. The whole basis for this three-fold definition was the primary act 
of God in creation whereby he gave himself in his eternal stability as the 
'promise' of history. Since God's act was an act of promise its guarantee was 
buried within the nature and being of God himself. Therefore, any moment of 
affirmation had always to be a moment of ontological contradiction because by 
it God revealed both his own infinity and also Man's finitude. 
The purpose of history could only become apparent when God chose to 
reveal part of his own nature as a holy, powerful, creative, redemptive God. 
His answer would always provide a question because his own presence would 
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condemn history to be perceived as ontologically limited. His judgement would 
be experienced primarily as judgement.6 6 
God's 'No', the questioning of the temporal by the arrival of the eternal, 
would only be perceived as a 'Yes' by those who were content to dwell within 
the realm of contradiction. Therefore, the Christian, and especially the 
Theologian, was expected to participate in the action of God within the world. 
The sovereignty of God demanded a response. The judgement of God 
questioned Man. 6 7 At the point of God's revelation history was simply 
dissolved. The acts of God in history could not be observed or defined. 
Therefore, Barth removed theology and the object of theological investigation 
from all normal realms of human experience. He differed in his method from 
Schleiermacher and Harnack in that the act of removal emanated from the side 
of the object, rather than from the side of the observer. Both his predecessors 
had tried to safeguard theology by using a series of presuppositions which they 
had built in to their method. Barth saw this as superfluous and destructive 
because God could safeguard his own existence simply by being himself. God 
was subject before he ever gave himself as object. Therefore, no form of 
historical method would be able to penetrate through to the inner nature of 
God's revelation.68 
The Divine is something whole, complete in itself, a kind 
of new and different something in contrast to the world. It 
does not permit of being applied, stuck on, and fitted in. 
It does not passively permit itself to being used; it 
overthrows and builds up as it wills. It is complete or it is 
nothing. 6 9 
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I f Barth was right about the subjectivity of God and the provisional 
nature of all thought then all theological 'method' was brought into question. To 
borrow one of von Harnack's questions, 
I f God is simply unlike anything said about him on the 
basis of the development of culture, on the basis of the 
knowledge gathered by culture, and on the basis of ethics, 
how can this culture and in the long run one's own 
existence be protected against atheism?70 
Dialectic theology was Barth's attempt to articulate the relationship between 
theology as a rational product of Man's existence with his inner search for unity 
with God. In what way could theology as a product of Man's rational mind 
capture that relationship?'. 
Barth's dialectic was born of the eschatological nature of existence. The 
ultimacy of life is what was straining to find expression. Theology was not a 
vain exploration of academic questions. It was the articulation of Man's deepest 
need. Whether it was also the expression of the answer to that need depended 
upon its relation to the nature of God. In this sense Barth's dialectic expressed 
the problem, but, within the context of his theology as a whole, it did not 
answer it. 
Barth rejected Schleiermacher on the grounds that the latter lost the 
ultimate need of a rational content in theology within a sea of subjective 
anthropocentricism. Barth saw Harnack as going to the other extreme by 
encasing the revelation of God in a framework of rational interpretation, which 
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in itself is ironic because Harnack actually sought to free the 'truth' from 
centuries of dogmatism. 
What Barth was trying to do was express the rationality of the 'content 
of the contents'. 
The only answer that possesses genuine transcendence, 
and so can solve the riddle of immanence, is God's word -
note, God's word. The true answer can hardly consist in 
neglecting the question, or merely underscoring and 
emphasising it, or dauntlessly asserting that the question 
itself is the answer.71 
Dialectic theology was Barth's first halting step upon the road to answering the 
question of his congregation, 'Is it true?' 
Barth saw the answer he was looking for in terms of God's 'word', that 
is, the rational articulation of God's purpose. He rejected Man's subjectivity in 
favour of God's subjectivity. He rejected Man's rationality in favour of God's 
'word'. He did not try to eliminate either the subjective or the rational from 
theology. 
Barth sought to express the rationality of God's subjective nature. He 
was trying to express the rational side of God's ontology. Eduard Thurneysen 
provides a definition of the premise which lay behind what was to develop; 
The existence, the life of man, on the one side, and on the 
other the Word of God that meets this life, lays hold of it, 
and transforms it - these are the two poles between which 
the spark must again begin to pass in order that there 
might be an arc of light that will illuminate all things. 7 2 
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This was an understanding of rationality as a function of movement. It 
was about the fluid nature of human thought as a condition of understanding 
divine changelessness. Conditioned by two static points, the need of man and 
God's answer to that need, this was not a form of universal relativism. It was a 
recognition of the need to allow for changing forms of thought in the expression 
of God's ontological rationality. 
This is a function of ontology. Therefore, the theologian was not so 
much a virtuoso as a mimic. The meaning of language and argument lay not in 
its 'outer' form, but in its 'inner' correlation with the revelation of God's own 
rationality. This rationality was 
complete and self-sufficient rationality, the rationality of 
God, who is so fully rational that he does not need to be 
interpreted in terms of anything outside himself. 7 3 
This basic premise dominated the first arguments surrounding Barth's approach 
to Biblical interpretation. 
In Julicher's criticisms of Barth's commentary on Romans74 there were 
echoes of Harnack. Julicher saw Barth as trying to escape the historical nature 
of the Biblical record. 7 5 Therefore, the argument was concerned with the 
historicity of God's revelation. For Julicher this was a matter of Biblical 
interpretation. For Barth it was a question of ontology. 
Barth was critical of any approach to theology which struggled only with 
the given text and did not attempt to push beyond the text to the force which 
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caused it to be written. I f theology did not concern itself with the 'content of the 
contents' it was simply concerning itself with the problems of a particular form 
of human rationality. This was Barth's criticism of his contemporaries,76 and a 
criticism which Brunner supported in his appraisal of Barth's early work; 
The empirical world takes part in the divine occurrences; 
but the latter are to be understood not in terms of it, but in 
terms of the "beginning" in God and of the "end" in God, 
in terms of the past and future which lie in the eternity 
which is beyond.7 7 
In this view all aspects of human life were only understood correctly in 
their relation to God. Since God was a living God, the theologian was faced 
with the challenge of trying to express a living nature in dead forms of human 
rationality. Therefore, dialectic thought was a process which attempted and 
always failed, to capture the movement of God through and in history. To 
express this Barth chose to use the visual image of a flying dove. The 
Theologian attempts to draw the dove in flight, 
our position is really an instant in a movement, and any 
view of it is comparable to the momentary view of a bird 
in flight. Aside from movement it is absolutely 
meaningless....78 
It was this attempt which Barth found in the pages of Scripture. In this 
sense dialectic theology was an attempt to reflect a way of thinking which Barth 
saw as having its roots within the Bible. 
What the Bible is interested in never loses its importance 
but is never captured in a word. It desires not to be 
accepted but understood... It is through and through 
dialectic. Biblical dogmatics are fundamentally the 
suspension of all dogmatics. The Bible has only one 
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theological interest and that is not speculative: interest in 
God himself. 7 9 
This particular quote has brought Barth's argument ful l circle. He began 
in his pulpit in Safenwil and in a very important way never left i t . The shadow 
of judgement, the adumbration of expectancy, was at its deepest and darkest 
where the holiness of God drew near. This was the point at which the Preacher 
had to stand if he was to follow after the movement of God, seek the eternal 
within the temporal or catch the dove in flight. Above all else he had to be a 
courageous man. 8 0 
Barth argued that the Question of God would also become the answer to 
those who would persevere. The cross of Christ was the answer for the world 
only when it became the place of deepest questioning. It was in the dereliction 
of Christ, the scandal of desertion, that the greatest light was shed upon the 
world. In Christ's cry of dereliction God's 'No' was heard. The resurrection 
was the sounding of his Yes. 
This No is really Yes. This judgement is grace. This 
condemnation is forgiveness. This death is l i fe . . . . The 
crucified is the one raised from the dead.81 
Therefore, dialectic theology was, on the one hand, the affirmation of 
God's freedom in his ontological subjectivity. On the other, the denial of any 
possibility that Man's rationality could grasp or articulate what is an ontological 
answer to his ontological need. This was why Barth insisted that the Preacher is 
the real Theologian. It was in the pulpit that ontological answer and rational 
inadequacy were brought together with shattering force. 
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Dialectic theology raised the basic question as to how suggested forms of 
knowledge could be verified. How could Man's rationality relate to the dove in 
flight? What was to prevent the theologian from mistaking mere metaphysical 
speculation for the genuine article? How could the rationality of Man become 
bound to the eternal in a sufficiently disciplined way? 
For Schleiermacher and Harnack, objective truth was an already present 
'given', woven into the fabric of the world. For the former this meant that Man 
was 'religious', and it was the realisation and acceptance of this which 
ultimately led to his greatest social and cultural development. In this case the 
'given' was an inner spiritual nature which provided a stable and unchanging 
basis for theological truth and reality. For the latter, objective reality was 
suspended in the medium of history like chalk suspended in water. Harnack 
developed his own historical method to strip away that which was historically 
conditioned. Therefore, for both these theologians truth was an inherent 'given'. 
Barth differed because he saw truth as a 'given' only when God gave 
himself. Objective truth emanated from the font of all truth. But since God was 
a living Subject, then the perception of objective reality occurred only as a 
spontaneous, momentary, gift. Therefore, because the Object of theology was 
also Subject, then the 'givenness' of objective reality could never be inherent in 
either of the senses put forward by Schleiermacher or Harnack. The discovery 
of any form of objective truth always remained beyond the realm of method or 
process. 
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Also, because the true nature of reality was dependent upon a clear 
perception of God's rationality in history, and since such a rationality was 
apparent only when the temporal and eternal are brought together, then this 
meant that all forms of objective truth were eschatological. Objectivity could 
not be separated from eschatology, and because eschatology always remained in 
the sphere of the divine grace, then the objective perception of any form of 
reality had also to be the product of grace. 
I f Barth was right in his assertion that the questions of life are simply an 
adumbration of a deeper truth, and that the key to understanding this truth could 
only be sought in the area of ontology. And i f he was also right that at the point 
of ontological questioning Man was confronted not with questions about 
himself, but about God, who is the Truth under which he lived, then this had to 
reflect upon any perception of evil as an objective reality. 
What it meant was that the truth of a given 'object' could not present 
itself to Man simply 'in itself. From a theological point of view truth was 
always relational. Questions of existence could only be understood in terms of 
their relation to God whose existence was itself the ontological foundation of all 
other forms of truth. Since God was both question and answer, then theological 
'objectivity' was dependent upon the perception of an ontological relationship. 
However, the subjectivity of God precluded any simple connection 
between the temporal and the ontological. This meant that the theologian was 
dependent upon God's giving of himself. It also meant that i f he was not to fall 
101 
Dialectic Theology 
into the same error as Schleiermacher and Harnack whereby he introduced a 
third principle to interpret God's self-giving, he had to discover a point at which 
God's revelation contained its own inherent rationality. This was a necessity 
forced upon him by the resurrection of Jesus which denied any possibility of 
Man's rationality, based as it was upon a limited ontology, from expressing the 
self-giving of God. 
Therefore, before any theological understanding of the objective 
existence of evil could be reached, the theologian must discover a point at which 
God's own rationality is expressed in a form which human thought can at least 
begin to articulate. This was for Barth the precursor to any theological 
understanding of objectivity reality. Whether Barth was able to discover such a 
point is a question which must now be looked at. 
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Between 1911 and 1931 Barth concentrated with singular intensity upon 
the questions surrounding the nature of God. This one concern dominated all his 
thinking during the early years. It cast a theocentric shadow under which 
thoughts about Man, Jesus and salvation all came to be examined from a 
particular point of view. Barth's concentration upon this theme was "as 
resistless and unbroken as the theme of a Bach fugue... 1 
He was fuelled in his relentless searching by an intense awareness of the 
subjectivity of God. This emphasis upon God's unique ontological freedom he 
had learnt from Blumhardt and the Bible. It has already been pointed out that 
this aspect of Barth's thinking gave rise to his particular form of dialectic 
theology. 
It has also been pointed out that Barth was not unaware of the 
weaknesses of his theology. It is interesting to notice that in his early thinking 
Barth did not confuse Man's basic need for God with speaking about God 
himself. He was the first to admit that strictly speaking his 'theology' lacked 
content. Throughout those years the answer to Barth's basic question concerning 
the nature of God eluded him. God still remained hidden in his own 
subjectivity, he still remained a righteous god whose righteousness was 
independent of Man. 2 
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Barth remained only too aware that God could not be grasped as other 
objects might. The barrier of ontology was both a promise and a problem.3 He 
was unable to define in clear terms the point at which God revealed himself to 
Man such that human rationality might express that revelation. 
It was this deep sense of inadequacy that provided the foundation for a 
theological position which Barth was to develop only years later. In spite of 
everything he felt absolutely compelled to speak of God. 4 As a Pastor and 
Preacher he was drawn to speak of that which was beyond his grasp. 
This meant that in his early theology Barth was unable to approach or 
speak of God directly. Instead he concentrated upon the dichotomy which he 
saw existing in the relationship of God and Man. This in turn led to a theology 
based upon the language and imagery of "impact".5 Barth's approach to God 
was from the direction of Man's ontological inadequacy. 
It is clear that the solution to the problem of ontological dichotomy both 
dominated and alluded Barth during this period. He was unable to discover in a 
satisfactory way the point at which God's own living rationality was revealed to 
Man. 
This meant that his early thought was dominated by the theme of 
'contradiction'. This he understood to be the characteristic and direct result of 
God entering into the world of Man. I f the student approaches Barth's early 
theology from this point of view it is easier to appreciate the content of his fiery 
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polemic. It is also easier to appreciate the inherent weaknesses of the theology 
which he developed. 
The earlier discussion of the debate with Harnack illustrated one 
supremely important theme in Barth's early work. He was perplexed by the 
nature and mechanism of history. This was as a direct result of his 
understanding of the resurrection and carried the mark of both Blumhardt and 
Overbeck. It provides a focus for discussion because it opened directly onto the 
problem of ontology. 
The argument concerned the nature of God's revelation in and through 
history. Overbeck and Blumhardt provided a critique of Harnack's position. 
Barth used their understanding of God as being ontologically distinct from 
history to counter-balance the confidence which Harnack had expressed in his 
search for the 'historical Jesus'. The positive side of Barth's critique was that it 
provided a genuine attempt to explore the notion of God as divine Subject. 
In the early chapters of The Epistle to the Romans Barth explored this 
idea in terms of Man's experiencing the subjectivity of God as an encounter 
with the divine "incognito".6 In this way Barth based his thinking on an 
understanding of God's absolute freedom. 
No divinity remaining on this side the line of resurrection; 
no divinity which dwells in temples made by with hands 
or which is served by the hand of man; no divinity which 
NEEDS ANYTHING, any human propaganda... can be 
God. 7 
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To express the notion of the sovereignty of God Barth used the language 
of distance.8 However, Harnack's accusation of a descent into gnosticism9 was 
completely misguided. Harnack failed to understand the relationship in Barth's 
thinking between the 'nature' of God and the 'wi l l ' of God. 
What this meant was that Barth understood God to be distant in an 
ontological sense, that is, unique, free, Subject. However, he did not mean 
distant in the sense of disinterested or uncaring. What Barth was trying to 
express was "the divinity of God". 1 0 God was distant because he was divine. 
Barth simply meant that there could not be, in the ontological sense, an inherent 
relationship between God and Man. This point of unity could exist only within 
the free will of God and as a result of divine condescension. At this point 
Barth's theology was pure Blumhardt. 
This rationale provides the reasoning behind Barth's enormously strong 
emphasis on 'contradiction' as a sure sign of the presence of God. It served to 
highlight the points at which Man had allowed the 'Answer' to 'question' his 
life. This was grace to Barth's way of thinking, God's contradiction of that 
which was limited so as to free it from its limitation; 
Grace is radically contrasted with the whole realm of 
human possibility... Though grace, on account of this 
contrast, lies beyond all human possibility, yet 
nevertheless, for the same reason, it judges human life 
and launches a disturbing attack upon it. In so far as in 
this contrast God is encountered, human life is re-
fashioned and provided with a new hope and a new 
promise.11 
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This was one of Barth's greatest themes during this period, Man had to 
be questioned before he could be affirmed. The ontological gulf which existed 
between God and Man could not be bridged from Man's side. 1 2 The whole 
fabric of the world was under a constant threat. Man was "unrighteous and 
humiliated" so that through the grace of God he could be "justified and 
exalted".1 3 Therefore, Barth traced the presence of God through what was not 
given 1 4 more than through what was. This way of thinking bore fruit in a 
theology of 'krisis ' . 1 5 
The krisis of Man's life was caused by the "void" 1 6 in which God 
revealed himself. This was the determinative factor in the relation of one with 
the other because of the ontological, and therefore rational, 'distance' which 
separated time from eternity. Man's knowledge of God had to remain obscure,17 
and all things be considered relative in relation to the subjectivity of God. 1 8 In 
this way all perceptions of God were deemed eschatological. 
So it was that Man found His life to be characterised by a series of 
questions to which there was no obvious answer: 
May God never relieve us of this questioning! May He 
enclose us with questions on every side! May he defend us 
from any answer which is not itself a question.... In that 
central void the answer to our questioning is hidden; but 
since the void is defined by questions, they must never for 
one moment cease.19 
Barth's us of the word 'void' was never meant to signify an emptiness. 
Paradoxically this 'void' was filled with the fullness of God's living presence. 
107 
Early Weaknesses 
However, it was perceived as paradox because Man's rationality could not grasp 
the subjective nature of God. 2 0 
This understanding highlights the problem which Barth faced. He had 
rejected the method of his teachers because he could not sanction the use of a 
'third principle', but he himself could not speak in positive terms about the 
revelation of God. 'Void' and 'paradox' could not, in Barth's mind, form the 
content of Christian theology. 
While Barth criticised the Biblical exegesis of his contemporaries for its 
failure to express the Bible's real content, his own theology suffered from the 
same inadequacy. 
To try and overcome it Barth created a powerful rational content against which 
to judge aspects of the world. In this way he moved unwittingly away from the 
foundation of ontology and developed a rational framework of his own 
invention. In an attempt to safeguard the autonomy of God against the onset of 
anthropocentricism his theology became axiomatic. 
This weakness arose out of an overriding desire to undermine the 
theology of the nineteenth century. The explosive impact which Barth's thinking 
had upon the theology of his day2 1 was born out of the same need. Barth 
himself said 
... things could not go on as they were doing. It was 
inevitable that bounds should be set to the then prevailing 
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theological conception by new and at the same time older 
and original Christian knowledge and language.22 
Barth's aim was to give back to God that awe and grandeur which should be his 
own by right. 2 3 Above all else God was to remain autonomous and independent. 
Barth tried unsuccessfully to build upon the fact of God's subjectivity. 
In this way he was able to acknowledge the relative nature of all 
theological statements, not in the sense of subjective or historical relativism, but 
because the written word was quite clearly not identical with the ontological 
truth of God. The movement of the Divine in history itself relativised all 
things. 2 4 Therefore, no valid theology could remain static. Such 'movement' 
had its origin 'from above': 
I mean a movement from above, a movement from a third 
dimension, so to speak, which transcends and yet 
penetrates all these movements and gives them their inner 
meaning and motive... 2 5 
The third dimension was God's own being. The history of salvation was 
one of intervention, the history of the world was one of condescension whereby 
God had bound himself to the world and given himself as its guarantor. 
It is in the contradiction of these two differing needs that the frailty of 
Barth's early thought becomes apparent. The need to "dethrone"26 the theology 
of his day overshadowed the basic premise upon which he built. This created a 
seriously flawed dialectic. 
109 
Early Weaknesses 
Any true revelation of God had to be an inherently free act. In this sense 
the message of Paul's letter to the Romans could "Wait". 2 7 The individual's 
response to revelation had no impact upon it, which meant that the theologian 
need not defend God. 
Barth's mistake was to defend that which needed no defence. This meant 
that God's freedom became merely an axiom and Barth was drawn into a merely 
intellectual argument having lost the ontological high ground. He failed to 
practice what he preached:28 
. . . we were fascinated then above all by the image and the 
conception of a "totally other" which we had no right 
without more consideration to identify with the divinity of 
him who is called Yahweh-Kyrios in the Bible. In the 
isolation, abstraction and absolutism in which we viewed 
it and opposed it to humanity, poor wretches - not to say 
boxed their ears with it - it still had or required greater 
similarity to the divinity of the God of the philosophers 
than to that of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.29 
In this sense Barth practised his own particular form of 
anthropocentricism. Not unlike Schleiermacher and Harnack, he introduced his 
own third principle. In this case it was the idea of the "totaliter aliter",30 the 
"infinite qualitative distinction"3 1 between God and Man. 
However, i f God's purpose was not to be found through spiritual 
introspection or suspended in history neither was it to be found in a purely 
rational model. Instead God's revelation of himself was observable only through 
"fai th", 3 2 and that in Jesus Christ. 
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Who and what God is in truth, and who and what 
humanity, we have not to explore and construct by roving 
freely far and near, but to read it where the truth about 
both dwells, in the fullness of their union, their covenant, 
that fullness which manifests itself in Jesus Christ. 3 3 
The true and necessary dialectic which existed between Man and God 
became apparent and real in the person of Jesus Christ. Therefore, it was to a 
deeper apprehension of the Christocentric nature of theology that Barth turned 
next: 
This is not a rational, obvious, self-evident procedure, but 
it is the nature of revelation... Without eyes there cannot 
be sight, and without God there cannot be eyes.34 
For this reason Barth judged the whole of the pre-war era to be a flight 
from a proper understanding of God's revelation in Christ to differing forms of 
idolatry: 
The images and likenesses, whose meaning we have failed 
to perceive, become themselves purpose and content and 
end. And now men really have become slaves and puppets 
of things, of 'Nature' and 'Civilization', whose 
dissolution and establishing by God they have 
overlooked.35 
The Christian, on the other hand, in his acceptance of the non-historical 
nature of the resurrection could embrace is existence as creature, thereby paying 
due homage to God whom he experienced through the seemingly meaningless 
contradictions of his life. Therefore, in Christ, God 
affirms Himself by denying us as we are and the world as 
it is. In Christ God offers Himself to be known as God 
beyond our trespass, beyond time and things and men.... 
He acknowledges Himself to be our God by creating and 
maintaining the distance by which we are separated from 
H i m . . . 3 6 
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While this growing emphasis upon the person and work of Christ 
certainly played a part in Barth's early theology, he was unable to develop it 
with the depth and clarity which was necessary. To a large degree Jesus 
remained only a point of contradiction. Barth paid the person of Jesus scant 
attention except to insist that in him the contradiction which sinful Man refused 
to acknowledge was revealed in its totality. 
In Christ the consistency of God with Himself - so 
grievously questioned throughout the whole world, among 
both Jews and Greeks - is brought to light and 
honoured.37 
Jesus was the bringer of the Gospel because through him was revealed a 
world distinct from our own, 3 8 he was the 'krisis' of the world, 3 9 the point at 
which the "crimson thread" of divine history was revealed.40 The efficacy of 
Jesus' witness lay in the fact that through him God's Righteousness was 
revealed and all men were seen to stand upon a single, finite, temporal plain. 
Therefore, Jesus was the person in history through whom God chose to 
justify himself.4 1 His resurrection was the point at which God transformed time 
into eternity, uniting two conflicting and contradictory ontologies. The 
impossible marriage of the righteousness of Man and the Righteousness of God 
took place. 
The new Day which has dawned for men in the 
resurrection, the day of Jesus Christ, this... is the day that 
ushers in the transformation of time into eternity. 4 2 
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For the same reason the only thing that Barth could say of the Christian 
was that in him a "void" became apparent. Therefore, his value lay not in what 
he was, but in what he was - not. 
His importance may consist in his poverty, in his hopes 
and fears, in his waiting and hurrying, in the direction of 
his whole being towards what lies beyond his horizon and 
beyond his power. The importance of an apostle is 
negative rather than positive. In him a void becomes 
visible. 4 3 
Ultimately Barth was able to say very little about the content of objective 
truth. He was able to articulate in powerful terms the fact of its existence and 
point to its basis within the ontological nature of God. However, he was never 
able to find a substantial foundation for his theology. He defined his arguments 
by reference to terms which he chose, but which need not in themselves appear 
compelling to others. It is obvious that the basis for defining what is objectively 
true cannot be in terms of whether or not a person agrees with Karl Barth. 
Barth's entire theology was unhinged by his inability to express the 
rational form of God's revelation. Instead, he imposed his own thought in an 
attempt to bury the theology of the nineteenth century. Ironically, he created his 
own form of anthropocentricism. 
It was impossible to verify what Barth was saying because he provided 
no external point of reference. The weight of his theology hung upon the 
intellectual structures which he himself erected and this proved to be its greatest 
weakness. 
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It is obvious that Barth saw the solution to this problem in a greater 
emphasis upon the Christological nature of revelation. Why this should be the 
case is best illustrated with an examination of Barth's understanding of the 
theology of Anselm. 
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The previous chapter has served to highlight the fundamental weaknesses 
in Barth's early theology. What he had failed to do was discover a method 
whereby theology could find a satisfactory relation to rationality. Having 
rejected sub-rational subjectivism on the one hand and historical relativism on 
the other, he needed to develop a new method of rational interpretation. 
Above all else, this new understanding needed to respect the 'object' of 
theology. This meant a form of rationality that could express ontological truth. 
I f it proved impossible, theology would be doomed to a fruitless future. 
Barth's interest in Anselm originated in 1930 with a seminar on the 
latter's Cur Deus Homo.1 Barth expressed his desire, as a result of this study, to 
"deal with Anselm quite differently from hitherto".2 The result was crucial to 
Barth's movement towards 'dogmatic' theology. 
In the Preface to the Second Edition of Fides Ouaerens Intellectum he 
made the point that, of his critics, only Hans Urs von Balthasar had understood 
"how much it has influenced me or been absorbed into my own line of 
thinking". 3 Commenting upon this particular piece of writing he said, "in this 
book on Anselm I am working with a vital key... as the only one proper to 
theology".4 To discover why this should be the case, it is important to trace the 
line of Barth's interpretation of Anselm. 
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The weakness of Barth's theology lay in his 'need' to express a 
particular understanding of God, in contrast and opposition to the theology of 
his day. This necessity led to a distortion of his thinking. A rational straight-
jacket was imposed upon the 'object' of theology. 
Barth began his study by pointing out the "absence of necessity"3 in 
Anselm's thinking. This he attributed to a particular understanding of the 
purpose of theology. Since Anselm was interested in the "aesthetics of 
theological knowledge", what did '"to prove' mean, i f it is the result of the 
same action which may also lead straight to delectatioV . 6 Clearly, a search for 
delectatio was not the driving force behind Barth's early polemic. 
This understanding Barth attributed to Anselm's view of 'to believe'; "a 
striving of the human will into God". 7 This was more than an assent to a series 
of rational statements. It contained an ontological reference. It was the quest of 
one ontological being for another. Therefore, 'belief was ontological before it 
is rational in the sense that it was relational rather than simply axiomatic. 
This meant that the rational 'necessity' which dominated Barth's early 
work was completely lacking in Anselm. Rationality was subordinated to 
ontology, not in the Schleiermacher sense of becoming ultimately irrelevant, but 
because it remained inherent in ontology. I f this was the case then, 
It is the presupposition of all theological enquiry that faith 
as such remains undisturbed by the vagaries of theological 
'yes' or 'no' . 8 
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I f faith was a striving of the human will 'into' God, then 'belief, of 
itself, was not a rational thing. In Barth's explanation of Anselm he outlines a 
precise order of priority in the relationship which exists between belief, 
understanding and proof. 
Anselm wants 'proof and 'joy' because he wants 
intelligere and he wants intelligere because he believes. 
Any reversal of this order of compulsion is excluded by 
Anselm's conception of faith. 9 
Understanding arose as a direct result of Man's striving 'into' God. This was 
because His participation in the nature of God uncovered a deeper, pre-existent 
rationality. 
This was exactly the point which Barth failed to make in his dialectic 
period. In an attempt to be 'scientific', he undermined his own insistence upon 
the primacy of faith by building upon a form of rational under-pinning, namely, 
his dogged pursuit of the idea of the 'totally other'. 
Having defended that which, or better He whom, needed no defence, 
Barth learned from Anselm that 
It is not the existence of faith, but rather - and here we 
approach Anselm's position - the nature of faith, that 
desires knowledge... It is my very faith itself that 
summons me to knowledge.10 
Therefore, Barth's polemic, rather than being worthwhile, merely illustrated a 
rational subversion of an ontological foundation. This was a mistake which 
Anselm did not make because he maintained the primacy of faith, over and 
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above that of reason. Barth drew out four converging strands in Anselm's 
thought which highlighted the "compulsion"11 of faith to search for 
understanding. 
Anselm understood God to be both summa Veritas and causa veritatis.12 
He was the one in whom "intelligentia and Veritas are identical".1 3 In God there 
was no disparity between rationality and ontology. Therefore, his "Word to us 
is nothing other than the whole truth of the substance of the Father".14 
This meant that to search for proof, to be drawn into the 'being' of God, was 
inescapably also to be drawn into rationality. 
At the same time, because faith was a "movement of the w i l l " , 1 5 and 
Man was a rational creature, such a movement had to involve Him in an act of 
choice. Because this involved a decision between what is "just and unjust, true 
and untrue, good and bad",16 then faith was, in part at least, informed by Man's 
reason. 
As a "striving of the will into God", faith could not occur without 
something new encountering Man from outside.17 It could never simply be a 
product of Man's nature. The "seed" which was received was the "Word of 
God" which was "preached and heard".1 8 Once accepted, it encountered within 
Man a "potestas",19 a potential for recognizing, knowing and loving "the best 
and greatest of all".20 Therefore, faith had to precede knowledge because "the 
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completeness of Man's likeness to God as restored in the Christian, demands 
i t " . 2 1 
Finally, Barth drew from Anselm an eschatological viewpoint based 
upon the relationship between faith, knowledge and vision. Anselm was quoted 
as having called "the intellect which we take in this life the medium between faith 
and sight".22 
By this, Barth understood Anselm to mean that knowledge was the 
medium which connects the "striving" of Man's wi l l into God, which is the 
content of faith, with the consummation of that desire, which he calls 
"vision". 2 3 Therefore, while knowledge most certainly had its limitations,2 4 it 
was also capable of providing a "similitudo of vision". 2 5 To refuse such a 
possibility had to be, to Anselm's mind, "negligentia" 2 6 
Because he saw understanding to be inherent within faith, Anselm was 
able to accept the "possibility of theology".27 This was such a long way from 
Barth's thinking in the years of his dialectic theology. There he struggled to 
express in rational terms the subjectivity of God. In those early years the 
eschatological emphasis in his thinking precluded the possibility of making 
positive statements regarding the content of theology. 
We cannot speak of God. For to speak of God seriously 
would mean to speak in the realm of revelation and faith. 
To speak of God would be to speak God's word, the word 
which can come only from him, the word that God 
becomes man. We may say these three words, but this is 
not to speak the word of God, the truth for which these 
words are an expression.28 
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Barth clearly found in Anselm an understanding of the relation between human 
rationality and divine revelation, such that he could envisage the "possibility of 
theology". 
Barth began his explanation of how this might be possible with the 
perception that, for Anselm and the Early Church, fides could never be 
"illogical, irrational and, in respect of knowledge, wholly deficient tendere in 
Deum".29 Faith was directed towards, and into God, whereby it was a "proper 
action of the wil l" and therefore contained a rational aspect.30 
Faith was the result of hearing, which itself was caused by preaching.31 
Because faith was the result of Man's awakening under the influence of God's 
"seed",32 and this was the "Word of Christ", 3 3 then it followed that the "Word 
of Christ" could be "legitimately represented by particular human words". 3 4 
While Barth was unable to name precisely those words which Anselm 
would have happily called "legitimate", he was able to identify the fact that for 
the latter there existed, alongside the "credo"3S of the individual, a "Credo"36 of 
the Church which formed an "unimpeachable point of reference".37 Because 
faith arose out of the '"Word of those who preach Christ'", 3 8 then faith was 
assuredly nothing less than the awareness of a sound 
signifying a thing, of a coherent continuity that is 
expressed logically and grammatically, which, having 
been heard, is understood and now exists in intellectu.39 
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In other words, because the "seed" awakened in Man was itself the 
"Word of Christ", and because this was brought about by those who "preach the 
Word of Christ", then there had to exist a form of continuity between the two. 
The fact that this understanding existed "in intellectu" meant that it need 
not be exclusively Christian. The difference between Christian and non-
Christian was that, for the former, the rational thought which existed in the 
intellect was seen to correspond with an "object".4 0 This was not the case for 
the latter. 
to the esse in intellectu is added the intelligere esse in re -
faith is assent to what is preached as the Truth, assent for 
the sake of Christ who is its real and ultimate Author and 
who, himself the Truth, can proclaim only the Truth. 4 1 
In other words, the Christian was one who assented to the truth of 
rational statements 'regarding' Christ because he accepted that they correspond 
to an ontological truth ' in ' Christ. He knew that there must exist this 
relationship between statements of belief and the 'being' of Christ because 
"voluntas Dei numquam est irrationabilis" .42 
The "awareness" of a "coherent continuity" within statements of faith, 
juxtaposed with the Christian's "assent" to the Truth expressed in Christ, meant 
that theology became a real possibility: 
And just because the beginning and the end are already 
given in faith, and because all that has to be settled 
regarding the intelligere that we are seeking is the gap 
between these two extremes, this intelligere is a soluble 
problem and theology a feasible task.4 3 
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In a sense, this quotation brought ful l circle the process which began in 
Barth's thinking during his time in Safenwil. 4 4 What began with a speculative 
return to the Scriptures and a growing awareness of "a God who goes forth in 
his Word", culminated in this clear articulation of the possibility of a developed 
theological position. 
It began, as did all of Barth's thinking, with an awareness of the 
"Godness of God". To express this using Anselm's phraseology, "quo maius 
cogitari nequit"*5 - that than which nothing greater can be conceived". Both 
Barth and Anselm began with "One who is exalted absolutely above and beyond 
us". 4 6 This was for them not merely a logical building block 4 7 but a statement 
which reflected the disparity between creature and Creator. 
Therefore, because God was 'beyond' Man's conception, any form of 
knowledge relating to the deity had to be the result of an act of divine grace. 
Torrance expresses it well when he says that 
it is not possible to think beyond God, or to think from a 
point where one can look down on God and oneself...48 
This might, at first glance, seem to be a re-phrasing of Barth's conception of the 
"totally Other", which proved so destructive in his early thinking. In fact the 
two are poles apart. 
It has already been shown that Barth's insistence upon the uniqueness of 
God expressed itself in an axiomatic form. The weakness in this approach was 
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that as a purely rational statement, the idea of the "totally Other" could claim no 
objective point of verification. It needed only to remain true in the mind of 
Barth. 
In contrast, Anselm did not begin from an axiom, but with the fact of 
revelation. God was someone who addressed Man in his Word, who gave 
himself, and thereby created the possibility of theology. Certainly God was the 
'object' of theology, but he was not a "static"49 object. His living nature 
precluded such a possibility. This meant that theology began with God because 
it was primarily an act of "obedience".50 
This was the point which Anselm made in his "proof". I f it was possible 
to conceive of an object greater than God, then Man has not as yet encountered 
the true God. Man's rationality, being dependent upon God to reveal himself 
before theology could properly begin, had always to remain subservient to the 
God who gave himself. Any form of rationality which could supersede this 
process simply proved itself to be inadequate. This was the whole basis of 
Anselm's "fides quaerens intellectum".51 Faith was a Christian's assent to the fact 
of God's pre-existence, prior to his giving of himself in his Word. 
Therefore, faith was never a believing of what was preached. It was 
belief in the reality which lay behind the spoken word, which was mediated to 
Man through the sermon.52 Echoes of Barth's early essays bear witness to his 
search for that objective reality which gave rise to the actions of the saints and 
leaders of the Church. 5 3 
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The limitations which are imposed on theology could never be those of 
culture or historical method. They always had to arise from the side of the 
'object'. As a dependent discipline, the pursuit of the theological task could 
only begin as a response to a decision on God's part to share himself. 5 4 For the 
same reason, theological statements could only be validated i f they were shown 
to correspond to the God whose decision allowed them to be construed. God 
"validates them by supplying himself as their object and thereby conferring on 
them their truth". 5 5 God was, and must always be allowed to remain, a self-
validating object. 
In many ways this particular idea reflected a trend which Barth 
discovered in Blumhardt. As a man who could think "organically", Blumhardt 
impressed Barth because of his capacity to recognise a unity in the relationship 
of God with the world. Blumhardt's understanding was in marked contrast to 
Schleiermacher and Harnack because it was based upon the will and attitude of 
God, rather than the capacity of Man. 
Set in the context of "Christ is Victor", Blumhardt's perception was 
based primarily around the salvation which God would instigate in the history of 
Man. As such it had little to say regarding the method of academic theology. It 
was a message of hope and vision which Blumhardt never tried to accommodate 
to the theological debate which was going on around h im. 5 6 
Barth took Blumhardt's idea of a unity existing in the wil l and purposes 
of God and developed it beyond the scope of Blumhardt's original context. 
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Blumhardt was concerned primarily with the response demanded of the 
Christian in recognition of the sovereignty of Christ declared in his resurrection 
from the dead. The fact that this response might involve a disciplining of His 
rationality was evidently something which did not concern, or suggest itself, to 
Blumhardt. 
In contrast, it was just this point that Barth was able to develop using 
Anselm's "fides quaerens intellection", the idea, that is, that the point of unity 
which Man so desperately required not only existed in God's sovereign wi l l , but 
within his very nature, since what God 'is' and what he 'does' were one and the 
same thing. In other words, God did not have an 'attitude', but rather a self-
determination to act. Now, because knowledge of God was revealed through an 
in his Word, then the unity he provided from within his wil l was not only 
authoritative, but also rational. In this way Barth was able to deepen and 
broaden Blumhardt's original conception. 
In turn, this meant he had to develop a model of rationality which was 
able to express the complex relationship which existed between God and Man. 
This was necessary because the unity which he sought existed ' in ' God. 
Therefore, theology, whatever it might involve, could never be the comparison 
of like with like. 
True knowledge of the object in its objectivity involves a 
penetrating into its inner rationality.5 7 
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This fact precluded any simplistic identification of a purely noetic expression 
with the ontological Truth which was God himself, and undermined once and 
for all the possibility of developing a theology upon purely axiomatic 
foundations. 
Barth suggested that Anselm was to be understood as using ratio in three 
different ways. These were linked together in a descending line of importance. 
Ratio is used then in a dimension of depth; of the ultimate 
Truth, the ratio of God himself; of the words and acts of 
God in Revelation, the ratio proper to the object of faith; 
and Man's knowledge of the object, the knowing ratio 
which corresponds to the ratio of the object. 5 8 
This meant that while a relationship existed between God and Man along the 
causeway of rationality, this relationship was always dependent upon the 
decision of God to reveal himself. Therefore, "the Truth itself is master of all 
rationes".59 
While the discipline of theology involved the ordering of rational 
thought so as to correspond with the object which was given, 6 0 no amount of 
effort on the part of the theologian would be able to l i f t noetic rationality onto 
the plane which was above it. Therefore, the adequate expression of the object 
in noetic form was always the result of divine grace, because the necessary 
correspondence whereby noetic reason became 'truth' had to be the result of 
God's giving of himself in vindication of what s written. 6 1 
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This is a very different approach to either that of Schleiermacher or 
Harnack. In different ways they both adopted a model of theological inherency, 
that is, that there existed a point of correspondence between God and Man 
woven into the fabric of reality such that no new or spontaneous act of God's 
grace was necessary to reveal it. In Schleiermacher this meant an inner realm of 
the sub-conscious, in Harnack an absolute belief in the capacity of human 
reason. Both were happy to identify the means of unification as being within 
Man's reach. This had the effect of limiting God's freedom of revelation. The 
unity, which for Barth could only exist within the nature of the living God, was 
already apparent and could be attained by those skilled in either Christian piety 
or the historical-critical method. 
Barth's insistence upon a three-fold hierarchy of reason meant that 
theology was necessarily a discipline based around the exegesis of Holy 
Scripture. Because Man's reason needed to be conformed in likeness to the 
rationality present in God's giving of himself, it followed that 
Man's theological activity derives from and is determined 
by the activity of God himself in his Word, for it is that 
Word communicated through the Holy Scriptures which is 
the real object of his knowledge.62 
This was a natural development of Barth's earlier notion of God as both 
'question' and 'answer'. The 'question' under which Man lived and which 
characterised his life was fundamentally ontological. However, as an attempted 
rational expression of this ontological truth, the Scriptures undoubtedly 
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contained more than a series of noetic statements whose acceptance or rejection 
formed the content of faith. 
It was this central awareness of the ontological reference inherent in the 
witness of the Bible to Jesus which has formed the background to most of the 
modern theological debate. Barth's profoundly Christocentric emphasis has 
arisen not simply out of personal preference, but because of his understanding 
of the relationship between rationality and revelation which to a large part he 
was able to articulate clearly because of Anselm. The truth which Barth focused 
upon so clearly in the 1930's still holds true, that the Scriptures are not 
concerned with religion, but with revelation. This means not simply a "quantum 
of supernatural information about God", 6 3 but God himself through his Word. 
It was this particular understanding which provided the impetus behind 
the new theological movement which began in the early years of this century 
and drew to itself theologians such as Barth, Bultmann, Brunner and Tillich. 
Initially it was fuelled by a common rejection of the anthropocentric trends in 
nineteenth century theology and an awareness of God's unique existence over 
and above his creation. Barth found a notable ally in Rudolf Bultmann whose 
genial review of Barth's first commentary on Romans came as something of a 
surprise.64 Both men agreed that the revelation of God must come afresh to each 
generation from beyond the historical plane. Where they differed was on their 
understanding of how and where that revelation could be found. 6 5 
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Where Barth differed from his contemporaries was in his determination 
to maintain the unique and absolute revelation of God in and through Christ, his 
living Word. In different ways, all those theologians who began life together 
with the rejection of nineteenth century subjectivism, have since diverged to 
follow different theological paths. Bultmann has engaged the philosophy of 
Heidegger to "distinguish between valid and in-valid self-understandings" within 
the Biblical text. 6 6 Brunner has used the notion of 'analogy', by which a limited 
knowledge of God could be gained from the world, so providing a necessary 
condition for correct human thought. Tillich, while accepting Barth's dialectic 
of grace and judgement, has insisted that this contradiction is found not only in 
God's Word, but also through nature, culture and the human spirit. 6 7 
What separated Barth from these other theologians was his dogged 
determination to allow the 'object' of revelation to provide from within itself the 
rationality which would validate its content. This was a theme which appeared 
in his essays of the 1930's. 
The Holy Scriptures will interpret themselves in spite of 
all our human limitations. We need only to dare to follow 
this drive, this spirit, this river, to grow out beyond 
ourselves toward the highest answer.68 
What Barth discovered in Anselm was an understanding of rationality that 
allowed him to develop a scientific approach to theology, while still paying due 
respect to 'object' of that science. 
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The attitude of the theologian to the 'object' before him should be one of 
"reverence, worship and humility". 6 9 This was because the 'object' under 
investigation already possessed its own ontological rationality born of its 
relationship with the causa veritatas, God himself. Therefore, the scientific 
nature of theology, correctly understood, was "a process of ascent from one 
ratio to an ever higher ratio".70 This meant that in the exegesis of Scripture the 
theologian was progressing from one level of rationality to another, dependent 
at every stage upon the Living God giving himself as the validation of what was 
written 7 1 
No exegesis that is content only with noetic rationality can 
be regarded as properly scientific, for scientific activity 
must penetrate through noetic rationality into the ontic 
rationality of its basis and so lay bare its inner necessity.72 
I f this scientific approach is broadened beyond simply the exegesis of 
Scripture and applied to Barth's early theology, it becomes clear that, as he said 
himself, those who threw themselves into revolt "were wrong at the very point 
where we were right". 7 3 He was right to reject the anthropocentricism of 
Schleiermacher, and also right to reject the ill-fated intellectual confidence of 
Harnack. Where he himself was shown to be inadequate was in 
not knowing how to carry into effect carefully enough and 
completely enough the new recognition of the divinity of 
God which so deeply stirred us then and others.74 
Where Barth's early theology really fell apart was in its inability to move 
away from the idea of the divinity of God, to the rational expression of that 
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ontological truth. In its place he developed the idea of the "totally other" which 
he admitted later 
we had no right without more consideration to identify 
with the divinity of him who is called Yahweh-Kyrios in 
the Bible. 7 5 
This failure mean that he was unable to bring about that relationship which was 
essential i f any real objective truth about Man and his world was to be found. 
His early identification of ontology as providing the key to 
understanding Man and his condition may well have been correct. His mistake 
was in not identifying the ontological reality of God's revelation with the person 
of Jesus Christ. This meant that his assertion that 'objectivity' was a truth only 
accessible through the presence of the Living God could not be developed as 
was necessary because of the pre-conditions which dominated his thought. The 
polemical character of his early work carried within it a profound weakness 
which ran far deeper than simply the level of content. Barth's early theology 
suffered from what might be called its own form of Barthian-rational-
subjectivism. 
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The principles which govern Barth's theology are surprisingly simple. 
Their development was detailed and penetrating but this should not be seen as 
over-elaboration. Throughout the years discussed in this thesis Barth's basic 
position did not change. There was development, there was a continual re-
assessment and re-stating of basic principles, but by and large the fundamentals 
did not change. 
In the early years as a Pastor in Safenwil, Barth was gripped by the 
"Godness of God". It was his growing awareness of the absolutely unique 
nature of the Creator in relation to his creatures which forced him to re-assess 
and then move away from the theology of his teachers. In this sense it was the 
eschatological nature of theology that came to the forefront of his thinking. This 
was never for Barth an escape into vain metaphysics or subjective reflection. It 
remained a constant theme throughout all his early work and without an 
awareness of it those who read his early writings might lose the direction and 
content of his thinking amid the harshness of his early polemic. Therefore, the 
first thing that needs to be said about Barth's understanding of 'objective' truth 
was that it always remained eschatological. In other words, questions about 
objective reality were first and foremost questions to do with the 'ultimate' 
nature of things, and this in turn meant that they were questions to do with God. 
Here was the fundamental point which cannot be stated too often: God is 
God. In Barth's mind the object of theology was always God. Theology as a 
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discipline, as a science, was dependent, and would always remain dependent, 
upon an object which was unique both in its nature and in its relationship with 
the theologian. In this sense Barth saw theology as a discipline which had to 
stand apart from all other human disciplines by virtue of the nature of its object. 
He was quite clear, even before he wrote on the thought of Anselm, that the 
theologian could not think from 'above' God. Therefore, the second thing which 
can be said of Barth was that he never understood theology to be a 'free' science 
because it was always dependent upon an object which was itself free, namely 
God. 
This truth, both simple and profound, was the driving force behind all of 
Barth's early work. His criticisms of Schleiermacher and Harnack were in 
themselves simply a clearing of the ground so that a fresh statement of this truth 
could be made. The growing awareness of God's uniqueness was expressed in 
the subject-object motif of the early period. 
The great weakness of his work at the time lay in its failure to grasp with 
sufficient depth the relationship between ontology and rationality. At least, even 
while Barth understood this, he was unable to develop his theological method 
around it. Instead his powerful polemic carried all before it so that the freedom 
of God to be first subject before he gave himself as object was buried beneath a 
whole series of arguments and ideas of Barth's own making. Even during the 
parly years Barth was well aware that to simply make a statement about God, 
even i f that statement carries force and commitment, does not make it 'true'. He 
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understood only too well that rationality in itself cannot be identified with 
content. 
The dialectic phase of his thinking marked an attempt to deal with this 
basic difficulty. At its root lay an awareness that the object of theology could 
not be grasped by the theologian. It was an acknowledgment on Barth's part of 
the unique subjectivity of God. The weakness of the method lay in its inability 
to make positive or authoritative statements regarding the content of God's 
revelation in Christ. Too often the "No" in Barth's dialectic smothered the 
"Yes" which he was trying to articulate. 
Even when Barth could see that the freedom of God had to be the 
overriding factor within theology his attempt to grasp that truth led to a flawed 
scheme of rational speculation. Even when he could see that the incarnation was 
not about the subjectivity of Man but the freedom of God, even then, his 
determination to free his thinking from the legacy of the past led to a distorted 
expression of the truth of God's revelation. Stated in its simplest terms, Barth 
tried to put words into God's mouth. 
Behind this failure lay the glorious simplicity of Barth's perception. He 
saw that theology existed as a discipline only because of God. God himself was 
the question which drove Man to speculate and think. Therefore, theology had 
to begin with ontology, and then not as an idea, but as an existence and a 
reality. In his own mind the basis of theology had to be God himself and his 
self-revelation as a result of his own free choice. Theology could only exist 
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because of God's self-determination to act and then only as a direct consequence 
of his divine nature. 
Barth insisted that God's giving of himself as an object was as a result of 
his unique subjectivity. Therefore, even when given as an object, Man could not 
grasp God like he might some other object because all other objects within 
Man's experience did not manifest this unique subjectivity. Therefore, Barth 
could see theology existing only i f the object in which God chose to manifest his 
subjectivity carried within itself its own means of making itself intelligible to 
Man. This in turn meant that God's self-revelation had to manifest itself in a 
unique unity of ontology and rationality. 
What would be the point of God's revelation i f it proved unintelligible to 
Man? Barth never wanted to replace what he saw as being the intellectual 
presumption of his teachers with a new form of Christian gnosis. His early 
writings were a determined effort to discover the way in which the inherent 
intelligibility of God's revelation might be expressed in the limited terms of 
human rationality. 
This was the crux of Barth's later theological development and the 
reason for his concentration upon Christology as the foundation of all his 
thinking. As was said at the beginning of this thesis, Barth saw revelation, 
ontology and rationality as being inseparably linked in all theological enquiry. It 
was his search for the inherent rationality of God's unique ontological nature 
revealed in objective form that fuelled all of Barth's work. 
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For this reason it is not possible to draw out of Barth's early theology a 
simple explanation of the objective existence of evil. This is the reason for his 
"side long glance", as Jiingel described it, which was alluded to in the 
introduction to this thesis. 
In Barth's mind questions of objective truth always remained 
adumbrations of that deeper question concerning God. He believed he could 
never say "this is the case" about Man before he said "this is the case" about 
God. Therefore, the truth regarding evil had to remain a secondary question 
which in the period under discussion he never really attempted to answer. 
Barth's theology began with God and therefore remained deeply 
eschatological. His awareness that objective truth could not be approached 
directly dominated his thinking. Perhaps scientists or anthropologists might 
make what they deemed to call 'objective' statements about Man, but the 
theologian could never allow himself this possibility. Theology remained in 
Barth's mind a discipline dependent for its meaning upon God. Theology began 
with God because its only legitimate source material, its only legitimate object, 
remained the inherently rational revelation of God, uniquely combining 
subjective and objective reality within itself. In other words, the person of Jesus 
Christ. 
Therefore, it is not possible to find in Barth's early theology a coherent 
understanding of objective evil. However, it can be said without fear of 
contradiction that the premise which lay behind his early theology precludes a 
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merely phenomenological approach to the understanding of evil, even i f the 
source material for such a study could be found. Barth would no doubt insist 
that questions about the objective existence of evil are concerned with God and 
therefore dependent for their solution upon God's free act of self-expression. In 
other words, they are Christological questions. 
In Barth's mind what mattered most was not that Man might say of God 
"this is the case", but rather that in his divine grace and mercy God had deemed 
to speak on his own terms and in his own unique way, and in that one living 
Word had said of himself and of Man all that ever needed to be said. To 
understand this is to begin where Barth himself began. 
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